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1.  PHILOSOPHY AND OVERVIEW1 
 
1.1. The basic social ethic 
 
  “Men  are  free  and  equal  in  rights”:  This  opening  statement  of  the  revolutionary 
Declarations of over two centuries ago constitutes the basis of the social ethics of modernity. 
This was meant for all persons and basic rights, but, more generally, equal freedom is the 
rationally  necessary  form  of  most  principles  of  justice  adequately  conceived  (apparently 
different principles are in fact limiting cases of this one). This will shortly be explained, but 
this result explains why it is useful to characterize equal freedom, and to define second-best 
freedom  egalitarianism  such  as  maximin  in  liberty  when  this  equality  is  not  possible  or 
cannot be efficient B and efficiency will also be defined and vindicated in terms of liberty. 
This paper will provide the corresponding basic concepts, characterizations and properties in 
focussing on the most basic and general value of freedom as means of acts and choices. 
 
  The social ethic analyzed here will choose the most widely relevant option for each of 
the choices raised by the constitution of a social ethic. It can thus be seen, in this sense, as the 
central or most important social ethic. But the basic concepts of the metaethics of justice are 
essential and should be recalled to begin with2. 
 
  The  concept  of  justice  can  be  derived  from  the  more  general  concept  of  social 
optimality  and  of  the  social  optimum,  that  is,  the  definition  of  the  best  in  questions 
concerning society. Justice is the aspect of the social optimum which considers situations of 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the French Government (NR BLAN06-2 
139446). 
2 More complete presentations are proposed in Kolm 1990 and 1996a.   2 
social entities called the "justiciables", when the considered situations are "for the sake" of 
the  justiciables.  Justiciables  can  a  priori  be  many  things  (such  as  individuals,  families, 
nations, firms, groups defined according to any possible criterion, cultures, and so on). In 
individualistic justice, the justiciables are individuals. The expression "for the sake" may 
refer to justiciables' view or to an outside ("paternalistic") opinion. In the former case, the 
considered  justice  is  respectful.  Our  concern  here  will  be  with  respectful  individualistic 
justice. 
 
A very important issue about justice is the place of the considered items in the ethical 
judgment. The aspects of the justiciables’ situations explicitly considered in a judgement of 
justice are called the situational variables. A conception of justice ultimately cares for certain 
items about which its evaluation is direct. They are the directly (or ultimately) relevant (or 
morally relevant) or evaluated items for this conception of justice. Other items evaluated by 
this  conception  are  only  indirectly  morally  relevant  for  it,  and  their  moral  evaluation  is 
indirect and derived from that of the directly morally relevant items. These directly morally 
relevant  items  may  be  aspects  of  the  justiciables,  but  they  may  also  be  other  aspects  of 
society  (for  instance,  global  aspects).  The  considered  situational  variables  may  be  these 
directly morally relevant items, and the judgment concerning them then is direct justice. But 
they  may  also  be  other  items,  different  from  the  directly  morally  relevant  items  though 
related to them, and the judgment concerning these situational variables is indirect or derived 
justice. For instance, we will consider the derived justice of individuals’ allocations for a 
conception of justice which takes individuals’ freedom of choice of these allocations as the 
variables  directly  relevant  for  justice.  Then,  the  just  allocations  will  be  defined  as  those 
which result from a just distribution of individuals’ domains of free choice3. 
 
  In  respectful  individualistic  justice,  the  items  directly  relevant  for  justice  are 
individuals’ means or ends. The means can be freedoms, rights, powers, assets, capacities, 
possibilities,  etc.  They  can  be  seen  as  freedom  in  a  broad  sense  of  the  term,  and  they 
determine a domain of free choice. We will consider here this freedom proper B rather than 
the limiting cases in which consumption goods are means for consumption, and consumption 
goods and capacities for being satisfied are means for satisfaction. 
 
  Taking this freedom as the item directly morally relevant for justice is the normal and 
most  general  case.  Indeed,  what  the  individuals  do  with  their  possibilities  is  generally 
considered a private issue, irrelevant to justice, distribution, and public policy (if it does not 
affect  other  people  without  their  will).  Individuals  are  prima  facie  responsible  for  their 
choices and acts, given their means, and hence they are normally held accountable for the 
transformation of their possibility sets into the actually chosen items. And the satisfaction, 
pleasure  or  happiness  they  derive  from  given  means  or  consumption  are  most  often 
considered a private issue irrelevant for justice which is a public and interpersonal concern. 
There  are  valid  exceptions  to  this  position,  but  they  solely  concern  a  minority  of  cases. 
Hence,  we  will  focus  here  on  this  most  general  case  of  respectful  individualistic  justice 
taking  individuals’  freedom  of  choice  as  the  items  directly  morally  relevant  for  justice. 
Justice  taking  freedoms  as  the  items  it  directly  morally  evaluates  is  freedom  justice,  or 
                                                 
3 In addition to these two kinds of variables – the directly morally relevant items and the 
situational variables – there may be a third kind, the instrumental variables, which are the items 
actually manipulated in order to achieve the optimum and justice. These variables may be any of the 
other kinds.   3 
eleutheristic justice (from the Greek word for freedom, and in opposition to eudemonistic 
justice which takes individuals’ happiness as the items directly morally relevant for justice)4. 
 
  The classical model of individuals choosing in domains of choice according to their 
preferences so as to best be satisfied, will be retained here. Then, the irrelevance, for direct 
justice, of choice and of satisfaction amounts to this irrelevance of individuals’ preferences 
which  direct  choice  (and  provide  satisfaction).  Hence,  freedom  is  described,  for  this 
judgment, by the corresponding domain of choice5. 
 
  The basic theorem of the metaethical theory of justice is that rationality in its most 
basic sense of “for a reason” implies that justice requires “prima facie identical treatment of 
justiciables identical in the relevant characteristics”6. In the present case, for direct justice, 
the objects of the “treatment” are the individuals’ domains of choice, and the individuals 
otherwise solely differ by their given preferences, which are irrelevant. Hence, justice is, 
prima facie, identity of the domains of choice. “Prima facie” means in the absence of an 
overriding reason, which can be impossibility, or impossibility of this equality along with the 
satisfaction  of  any  other  criterion  that  may  be  relevant.  Such  a  criterion  can  notably  be 
nondomination by unanimous improvement in the relevant individual items. When there is 
such  an  overriding  reason,  principles  of  relevant  second-best  egalitarianism  have  to  be 
defined B here principles of second-best freedom egalitarianism. Concepts of more or less 
free will then be needed, and the irrelevance of preferences entails that these concepts can 
solely be defined from inclusions of domains of choice.  
 
  An individual allocation will denote a bundle of consumption goods, plus possibly 
occupation, labor or leisure, and any other relevant aspect of the individual’s situation. An 
allocation will a priori denote a set of individuals’ allocations, one for each individual (when 
there  is  no  risk  of  ambiguity,  it  may  also  stand  for  an  individual  allocation).  We  will 
classically  consider  that  the  individuals  may  choose  their  individual  allocations  in  their 
domains of choice. The derived first-best eleutheristic justice (freedom justice) of allocations 
consists  of  allocations  which  can  result  from  identical  individual  domains  of  choice. 
Similarly, concepts of higher or lower freedom will translate into the field of allocations as 
allocations  which  can  result  from  set-included  domains  of  choice.  Hence,  individuals’ 
preferences  are  absent  from  direct  freedom  justice,  but  they  may  appear  in  the 
characterizations  of  indirect  freedom  justice  concerned  with  allocations,  since  a  chosen 
allocation depends on both the domains of choice and the preferences of individuals. 
 
  The  most  standard  model  of  individuals  will  be kept  here,  because  it  sufficiently 
describes a large number of cases (and it can be defended for the present social ethical use on 
the ground of rationality). Other assumptions are studied elsewhere7. The individuals will be 
concerned with their domains of choice solely for what they can have with them. Choosing 
entails no intrinsic appreciation, cost, or anguish of choice, or preference or aversion for 
                                                 
4  From  a  previous  remark,  one  can  also  see  eudemonistic  justice  as  a  limiting  case  of 
eleutheristic justice. 
5  That is, we do not consider, here, all the subtle aspects and types of freedom involving 
“mental freedom” (see Kolm 1996a, chap. 2). 
6  The most complete derivation of this result is to be found in Kolm 1998 (translation of 
1971), foreword 1997, section 5 (see also 1990, 1993). 
7  For instance, for the intrinsic value of freedom, in Kolm 1982, 1993, and for preference 
externalities in relation with justice and equal freedom in 1966, 1991b, 1995.   4 
responsibility.  Freedom  is  solely  instrumental  in  this  sense8.  This  is  the  most  basic  and 
general  value  of  freedom,  and  a  sufficient  hypothesis  in  many  or  most  cases.  Hence, 
individuals are indifferent between being provided with either directly their allocations or 
any  domain  of  choice  in  which  these  allocations  are  their  best  choices.  Moreover, 
individuals’  preferences  are  neither  directly  concerned  with  nor  influenced  by  others’ 
allocations or domains of choice (no externalities). 
 
  Let us also recall that one of the most classical methods in social ethics for judging 
situations  consists  of  considering  whether  they  could  or  would  result  from  adequately 
characterized free choices or processes. Compensations for past violations of rights in law or 
in process liberal theory belong to this category. But the main theoretical example is that of 
the  theories  of  social  contracts,  which  have  been  basic  in  social  ethics  for  the  last  four 
centuries.  These  methods  belong  to  eleutheristic  social  ethics  based  on  free  choices  and 
freedoms which need solely be potential, notional, hypothetical, or putative9.  
 
  Allocations  will  therefore  be  evaluated  according  as  they  can  be  obtained  from 
identical individual domains of choice, or from individual domains of choice which are one 
included in the other. When an allocation has such a property, it is possible to provide the 
individuals with domains of choice having these relations and from which they choose the 
considered  allocation.  Yet,  from  the  assumptions  the  individuals  are  indifferent  between 
being provided with such domains of choice or directly with the allocation. Moreover, as just 
noted, for a classical, common, and widespread – though not necessary – view in social ethic, 
the mere possibility that the allocation can be obtained by such free choices of the individuals 
suffices.  Hence,  the  individuals  can  actually  be  provided  with  corresponding  domains  of 
choice (or not), but solely the possibility will be the object of study here. We will thus 
analyze possible or potential freedoms corresponding to given allocations. 
 
1.2. An outline of concepts and results. 
 
1.2.1 Equal freedom, no less free, less free, freer. 
 
  The basic conceptual tool will be the sets of domains of choice which would or could 
lead to the considered allocation. An allocation is equal-freedom when it can be obtained 
from identical individual domains of choice. This turns out to occur if and only if there also is 
equal-freedom for all subsets, or solely for all pairs, of individuals. In fact, equal-freedom 
allocations turn out to amount to the situation in which no individual prefers any other’s 
allocation to her own. This constitutes, indeed, the basic and most important reason for the 
interest of this principle (“equity” for equal instrumental independant liberty)10. 
 
  An individual with her individual allocation is (potentially) no less free than another 
with her individual allocation if these allocations can be obtained from the choices of these 
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chap.2. Other purely instrumental values of freedom can for instance be found when the domain of 
choice per se provides social status (which can entail other advantages). 
9 The only type of social contract that rests on actual freedom is that which rests on consent 
(from  Plato’s  Crito  on).  But  this  is  a  very  particular  and  very  dubious  type  of  social  contract 
(emigration or rebellion can be very costly) – see Kolm 1985, 1996a. 
10 This will shortly be further discussed, along with the freedom-relevant variants of this 
principle.   5 
individuals in domains such that the former includes the latter. It turns out that as free as 
(equal-freedom for the pair) amounts to each being no less free than the other. Less free is 
defined as no no less free, and freer as no less free and not equally free (or no less free in one 
sense and less free in the other). 
 
  Applied  to  different  allocations  of  the  same  individual,  these  potential  freedom 
comparisons  amount  to  standard  preferences:  the  individual  prefers  to  be  freer,  does  not 
prefer to be less free and is indifferent to being as free. Hence, Pareto efficiency is equivalent 
when expressed in terms of potential freedom or in terms of preferences. Another relevant 
concept is that of the core: if groups of individuals have the right or the power to redistribute 
their allocations among themselves, then, if a group can do this in benefitting all its members, 
the allocation either is actually unstable or it does not implement the possibilities of free 
action, agreement, or exchange11. The absence of such groups (from one individual to all) 
characterizes allocations in the core. 
 
1.2.2. Indexes of freedom inequality, freest and least free. 
 
The numbers or proportions of the noted pairwise relations provide various measures 
of the degree of freedom-equality and freedom-inequality of an allocation. They also provide 
indices of individuals’ relative overall freedoms and unfreedoms, and freedom-rankings of 
individuals, with globally freest and least free, globally second freest and second least free, 
etc. For instance, such an index can be the number of individuals less free than a given 
individual minus the number of individuals to whom she is less free, or the converse, or 
similar  differences  with  relations  no  less  free  B  which  amount  to  the  same  B,  or  with 
relations freer, or the index can be the number or fraction of individuals with whom she is or 
is  not  equally  free.  Then,  second-best  freedom  egalitarian  principles  can  be  found  in 
allocations  which  minimize  these  overall  freedom  inequality  indices,  or  maximize  the 
freedom of the least free with possible leximin extensions of these maximins, in the relevant 
domain such as possible, efficient, or core allocations. 
 
1.2.3. Freedom-ordered allocations. 
 
An allocation is freedom-ordered when the individuals can be ranked in such a way 
that  each  is  no  less  free  than  the  following  ones.  This  is  shown  to  be  equivalent to the 
possibility of obtaining the allocation by individual choices in domains successively included 
into the preceding one(s). If the number of individuals is finite, an  allocation is freedom-
ordered if and only if there is no cycle (closed chain) of successive relations “less free”. And 
if the permutations of individual allocations among the individuals are possible, the existence 
of such a cycle implies that of a permutation which makes all the concerned individuals freer 
(and better off) – an “improving permutation”. This implies that the allocation is not efficient 
and is not in the core. Hence, with a finite number of individuals and possible permutations 
(that is, a symmetrical possibility set), efficient (and core) allocations are freedom-ordered. 
Freedom-ordered allocations, and all their restrictions to subpopulations, have sets of equally 
free freest individuals who are no less free than all individuals, of equally free least free 
individuals, such that all individuals are no less free then them, and, if the allocation is not 
equal-freedom, of individuals in each category who are not in the other (strictly least free and 
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or agreements as a result of a “liberal social contract” (see Kolm 1985, 1996a).   6 
strictly freest). Minimally least free individuals are least free with the largest number of 
individuals  freer  than  them,  and  maximally  freest  individuals  are  freest  with  the  largest 
number of individuals to whom they are freer. These properties provide the basis for various 
concepts of maximins and leximins shortly to be described. 
 
1.2.4. Entitlements and accountabilities for personal possibilities and limitations. 
 
  Moreover, individuals may not be able to have each individual allocation, and the sets 
of the allocations each can have may differ. One important cause of such limitations occurs 
when allocations include occupations, or income or consumption goods that can be obtained 
with a given work, because individuals’ abilities and productive capacities differ. But needs 
and various social reasons can also cause such limitations and differences. These limitations 
and differences are amenable to two kinds of ethical treatment. In one case, the individuals 
are accountable for their limitations and entitled to their possibilities (or accountable for or 
entitled to the particular specificities of their own limitations and possibilities, that is, in the 
measure in which they differ from others’). This is, for instance, the case of self-ownership of 
classical process liberalism. Or individuals may be accountable for certain of their needs 
(other individuals have no duty to pay for the satisfaction of these needs). In the alternative 
case,  these  differences  in  possibilities  and  in  limitations  or  handicaps  are  considered  an 
injustice which should be corrected or compensated for by the considered public policy. It 
may also be that limitations and differences with different causes are treated differently in 
this respect. 
 
  These  two  different  ethical  judgments  about  individual  possibilities  and  their 
differences entail two different technical treatments. When the policy is directly concerned 
with these differences in possibilities and tries to correct them, its notions abide by these 
constraints, that is, the potential domains of choice it considers for each individual solely are 
of individual allocations that this individual can have. By contrast, when the individuals are 
deemed  accountable  for  their  limitations  or  entitled  to  their  possibilities,  the  potential 
domains  of  choice  considered  by  the  theory  can  contain  individual  allocations  that  the 
individuals cannot have, since the individuals are accountable for not choosing them. The 
ethic, in this case, is not directly concerned with these limitations. But the individuals will 
choose,  actually  or  notionally,  solely  allocations  which  they  can  have.  Hence,  these 
possibilities  will  appear  in  the  indirect  expression  of  freedom  justice  which  considers 
allocations, as it is the case with preferences (by contrast, in the previous case possibilities 
appear in the definition of direct freedom justice). Yet, possibilities and limitations are here 
morally left to the individuals, as their preferences are. In fact, this case can be reduced to 
that in which preferences only are considered, in introducing derived preferences in which an 
individual allocation that an individual cannot have is considered as one which she finds less 
good  than  all  those  she  can  have  (the  “sour  grapes  preferences”  derived  from  actual 
preferences and possibilities). 
 
  In all cases, potentially equally free and no less free individuals with given allocations 
are still defined as the possibility that they choose their allocations from identical or included 
domains of choice. And it turns out that two individuals are equally free if and only if each is 
no less free than the other; and that a number of individuals are equally free if and only if this 
is the case for all subgroups, and even solely for all pairs. 
 
  There thus are three cases according as individuals: (1) have the same possibilities, 
and (2) are not or (3) are accountable for their differences. Then, equal freedom will be   7 
shown to respectively amount to: (1) no individual prefers any other’s allocation to her own; 
(2) the same plus “and each individual can have each other’s allocation”; (3) “no individual 
prefers, to her allocation, an other’s allocation that she can have”, or “each individual either 
does not prefer or cannot have each other’s allocation” (this was called “realistic equity”: 
individuals  compare  their  allocation  solely  with  those  of  others  that  they  can  have)12. 
Relatedly, potentially “no less free” will turn out to respectively amount to: (1) the individual 
does not prefer the other individual’s allocation to her own; (2) she does not prefer it and she 
can have it; (3) she does not prefer it if she can have it. And potentially “less free”, the 
opposite of “no less free”, thus respectively amounts to: (1) prefers the other’s allocation; (2) 
prefers it if she can have it; (3) prefers it and can have it. Finally, “freer”, defined as no less 
free and not equally free, is no less free in one sense and less free in the other. 
 
  When applied to the same individual and different individual allocations that she can 
have,  all  these  (potential)  freedom  comparaisons  amount  to  preferences  –  that  is,  an 
individual prefers to be freer, and not to become less free, and is indifferent to being as free. 
One consequence is that Pareto efficiency amounts to the same when expressed in terms of 
comparison of potential freedoms or in terms of preferences as it standardly is (we will just 
say “efficiency”). 
 
  The definition of freedom-ordered allocations from the relation no less free, and their 
general properties, are the same in all three cases. This includes the equivalence with the 
absence of “less free” cycles, with finitely many individuals. But, if the constraints other than 
individual possibilities allow for permutations, transferring an individual allocation to a less 
free individual is always possible if “less free” implies that she can have it (cases 1 and 3), 
but  it  may  not  be  possible  in  the  other  case  (case  2).  Hence,  the  impossibility  of  such 
improving permutations implies that of less free cycles solely in cases 1 and 3, since in the 
other case a transfer to a less free may not be possible. Thus, efficient and core allocations 
necessarily  are  freedom-ordered,  with  finitely  many  individuals  and  otherwise  possible 
permutations, in cases 1 and 3 only, that is, when individuals are entitled to or accountable 
for the differences in their individual possibilities (including the case where there is no such 
differences). 
 
1.2.5. Maximins in liberty. 
 
  There may be no possible allocations that are equal-freedom, or equal-freedom and 
efficient,  or  equal-freedom  and  in  the  core.  This  is  bound  to  result  from  limitations  in 
divisibility  or  in  transferability  (for  physical  or,  possibly,  social  reasons).  Second-best 
efficient  freedom  egalitarianism  should  then  be  defined.  Among  them  are  maximins  and 
leximins  in  (potential)  freedom.  In  the  circumstances  just  noted,  efficient  (and  core) 
allocations are freedom-ordered. Hence, there are least free and strictly least free individuals, 
second least free individuals when these are removed, and so on. This provides the basis for 
maximins and leximins. 
 
  If least free individuals13 are unique for each efficient allocation, there are four basic 
related  concepts  of  efficient  maximin.  An  efficient  maximin,  indeed,  can  be  an  efficient 
allocation whose least free individual is related to that of each other efficient allocation by 
                                                 
12 See Kolm 1971 (English translation, 1997), and applications in Kolm 1991a and 1993. 
13 Or strictly least free, or minimally least free.   8 
one of the four relations: she is freer or no less free than the other, or the other is less free or 
no freer than her (no freer means that either the individual is no less free or the other is less 
free). The freer maximin is unique if it exists. There cannot be both a no less free and a less 
free  maximin.  Least  free  individuals  for  allocations  which  are  not  a  less  free  or  a  freer 
maximin are freer with and prefer this maximin. The least free individuals of no less free 
maximins are equally free. 
 
  If least free individuals are not unique for some allocations, more alternative concepts 
are possible. They rest on the fact that the least free individuals with each allocation are 
equally free, and freedom is comparable among groups of equally free individuals. Among 
the possible concepts, the uniform maximins where all the least free individuals with each 





  Finally, a main phenomenon consists of the interferences between the structure and 
the  moral  status  of  constraints  and  possibilities,  and  this  is  in  particular  crucial  for  the 
realization of the optimum or just solutions. Efficient “realistic” equal freedom is guaranteed  
by  individuals’  independent  choices  in  domains  to  which  they  are  entitled.  A  notable 
application is classical liberalism in which the individuals are entitled to their own capacities. 
Symmetrical possibilities (i.e., allowing permutations of individuals’ allocations), in addition 
to self-entitled personal possibilities, entail that allocations in the core are freedom-ordered. 
This symmetry can also be a required rule since it amounts to equal interferring freedoms. 
 
  These concepts, properties, and results, and other related ones, will be presented and 
discussed. Section 1.3 will define the basic technical issues and concepts. Section 2 defines 
equal-freedom  allocations  and the  freedom  comparisons,  it  shows  the  basic properties of 
these  concepts,  and  the  characteristic  numbers  and  situations  derived  from  the  pairwise 
comparisons. Freedom-ordered allocations are analyzed in section 3 which shows their basic 
properties, those of least free and freest individuals, the layer structures of these allocations, 
the questions of the existence of “less free” cycles and of “improving permutations”, and the 
relations  with  efficient  and  core  allocations.  The  relations  between  potential  freedom 
comparisons  and  preferences  are  shown  in  section  4.  Section  5  then  shows  the  various 
concepts of freedom maximins and leximins. Section 6 considers the consequences of the 
structure of the constraints and possibilities, and of their moral status of accountability and 
entitlement. The longest proofs are gathered in section 7. 
 
1.3 Basic concepts and first notations 
 
Let N denote the set of individuals in number |N| ³2, i, j,…,N denote individuals, and 
I,J,… Í N denote populations or groups. J Ì I is a subgroup of I. The number of individuals 
in I is |I|, and |I| < ¥ means that this number is finite (this distinction will turn out to be 
crucial). 
 
Let A denote the set of individual allocations with |A|³2, xi0A denote an individual 
allocation for individual i0N, and xI = {xi}i0I 0 A
|I| denote an allocation for population (group) 
I Í N. The issue of whether a given individual can or cannot have certain allocations will be   9 
specifically discussed later. Given xi and J Ì I, xJ  = {xi}i0J , the projection of xI on J (or the 
restriction of xJ to J), is a “suballocation” of xI . 
 
A complete strict ordering (or strict ranking) of a set of individuals IÍN with the 
binary relation   will be denoted as ( ,I). The properties of this relation are the classical 
nonreflexivity, nonsymmetry, transitivity, and completeness . 
 
Xi  Í A will denote a domain of choice of individual i 0 N, and XI = {Xi}i0I is a profile 
of (independent) domains of choice for the population I Í N. Individuals i and j are equally 
free if Xi = Xj, and individual i is no less free than individual j if XiÊXj. The profile of 
domains XI for I Í N is equal if all the XI  for i 0I are identical. It is embedded if there exists a 
complete strict ordering of the set  I, ( ,I), such that i, j 0I and i j implies XiÊXj. An equal 
profile is a particular embedded profile (the ordering can be anything). Denote as EQ and EM 
the sets of equal and embedded domain profiles, respectively, for any I Í N. Then, 
XI 0 EQ Û (i0I ⇒ Xi = Y Í A), 
XI 0 EM Û [$( ,I) : i,j 0 I and i j ⇒ Xi Ê Xj], 
EQ Ì EM. 
Clearly, if JÌI and XJ denotes the restriction of XI to J (the projection of XI on J), XI 0 EQ ⇒ 
Xj 0 EQ and XI 0 EM ⇒ XJ 0 EM. 
 
If individual i0N is given a domain of choice Xi Í A, she chooses as her individual 
allocation  an  element  of  her  choice  set  ci(Xi),  xi0ci(Xi)ÍXi.  Since  the  allocations  will  be 
directly evaluated in comparing domains of choice, but the (indirect) justice of the allocations 
will be considered (they are the situational variables), the basic tool will be the converse 
correspondence: The freedom set  of individual i with allocation xi is the set of possible 




{Xi Í A: xi0ci(Xi)}, 





 ( ) denoting the set of parts of a set, ci  is a function  (A) ®  (A) and Fi is a function 
A ®  [ (A)]. 
 
For y 0A and denoting as {y} the singleton set, {y} = ci({y}) and {y}0 Fi(y). 
 
For  any  IÍN,  xI  0A
|I|  ,  or  XI0[ (A)]
  |I|,  denote  as  cI(XI)={ci(Xi)}i0I  and  FI(xI)  = 
{Fi(xi)}i0I. Then, allocation xI  is a possible choice for domain profile XI , or XI is a possible 
domain profile for allocation choice xI , or allocation xI and domain profile XI are congruent 
to each other, when the equivalent relations hold: 
xIÎcI(XI) Û XIÎFI(xI). 
 
We will later define equal-freedom and freedom-ordered allocations as allocations 
which can respectively be chosen from equal and embedded domain profiles. 
 
Define also as 
EI(xI) =
d
 1iÎI Fi(xi)  (1)   10 
the equal-freedom set of domains for allocation xI : the possible equal domain profiles for 
allocation xI have each identical domains XiÎEI(xI) for all iÎI, and allocation xI is equal-
freedom if EI(xI) ¹Æ, that is, FI(xI)1EQ ¹Æ. Of course, for JÌ I and the suballocation xJ of xI, 
EJ(xJ) Ê EI(xI). 
 
These  concepts,  derived  from  the  choice  sets  ci(Xi),  suffice  for  all  the  following 
concepts  and  properties.  However,  it  is  possible  to  relate  the  following  concepts  and 
properties to the classical concept of individual preferences. Then, individual iÎN will be 
endowed with the preordering Ri of A, Pi and Ii will respectively denote the corresponding 
strict preference and indifference (the antisymmetrical and the symmetrical parts of Ri ), and 
the choice set ci(Xi) will be the set of maximal elements of Ri on Xi : 
xiÎci(Xi) Û xiÎXi and ( xi
' ÎXi ⇒ xiRixi
' ). 
 
Moreover,  we  will  also  introduce  the  possibility  of  specific  limitations  on  the 
individuals’ possible allocations (in addition to the Xi). They will be denoted as Di, for each 
individual  i.  DiÍA.  If  all  Di  are  identical,  the  set  A  can  just  be  taken  as  the  same  set. 
Otherwise,  the  two  alternatives  previously  discussed  can  exist.  They  will  lead  to  the 
following modifications. If the differences in Di are considered as a priori unjustified from 
the point of view of justice, the Xi considered will have to be restricted to XiÍDi . If, by 
contrast, the individuals are entitled/accountable for their own Di, the choice sets will have to 
be  ci(Xi  1  Di),  and  the  rest  of  the  analysis  will  remain  unchanged.  The  case  with  no 
restrictions  or  identical  Di  is  a  particular  case  of  the  other  two.  But  the  case  with  self 
entitlement/accountability  can  also  be  reduced  to  this  case  in  replacing  the  preference 
orderings Ri by new orderings  Ri
' such that >,> ',Di ⇒ (>Ri> ' Û > Ri
'> ') and >,Di, > 'ÏDi ⇒ 
> P i
'> ' (the “sour grapes” transformation). This case is called the“realistic” case. The basic 
concepts for the case with no different Di extend to both other cases. But, moreover, all 
properties  with  no  different  (and  explicit)  Di  will  also  hold  for  the  “realistic”  case.  The 
question of different individual possibilities Di will be particularly analyzed in section 6. 
 
The existence of other constraints on the allocations xI will also be considered, with 
particular  interest  in  the  properties  of  symmetry  of  these  possibilities,  that  is,  of  their 
allowing permutations of individual allocations among the individuals, and in the efficient 
and core allocations (subsets E and CÍE respectively). 
 
2. EQUAL FREEDOM AND FREEDOM COMPARISONS. 
 
2.1 Equal-freedom allocations 
 
Definition 
Allocation xI for group I is an equal-freedom allocation when it can result from individuals’ 
free choices in identical domains of choice; that is, denoting as EF the set of equal-freedom 
allocations (for whatever I), 
xIÎEF   
d
Û EI(xI) ¹Æ ÛFI(xI) 1 EQ ¹ Æ.            (2) 
 
Clearly, xI ÎEF and J Ì I implies xjÎEF, since J Ì I ⇒ EJ(xJ) Ê EI(xI). But the more general 
converse will be shown: 
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Proposition 1 
An allocation for a population is equal-freedom if and only if it is equal-freedom for all 
subgroups,  and  if  and  only  if  it  is  equal-freedom  for  all  pairs,  of  individuals  of  this 
population. That is, 
xIÎEF Û (J Ì I ⇒ xJ ÎEF), 
and 
xIÎEF Û (J Ì I and | J | = 2 ⇒ xJÎEF) 
or 
xIÎEF Û [i, j Î I ⇒ (xi, xj)ÎEF]. 
 
The sufficiency of equal-freedom for each pair (and for each strict sub-group) for equal-
freedom for the group are not a priori obvious. 
 
2.2 Potential freedom comparisons 
 
Pairwise freedom comparisons “as free as” and “no less free than” 
 
Let Xk Í A denote a domain of choice for individual k. If, for two individuals i and j, Xi = Xj, 
individuals i and j are equally free. And if Xi ÊXj, individual i is no less free than individual j. 
 
Definition: potentially as free and no less free. 
 
But the situational variables are the individual allocations xi. And individual i is indifferent 
among being attributed xi or any domain of choice XiÎFi(xi), from the assumptions. Hence, a 
relevant concept is that of potential freedom comparisons: 
-  Individual i with xi is potentially as free as  individual j with xj when there exist 
XiÎFi(xi) and XjÎFj(xj) such that  Xi = Xj , that is, Fi(xi)1Fj(xj)¹ Ø. 
-  Individual i with xi is potentially no less free than individual j with xj when there 
exist XiÎFi(xi) and XjÎFj(xj) such that Xi Ê Xj. 
This will be written as, respectively, 
xi AF xj Û
d
 $ XiÎFi(xi), XjÎFj(xj) : Xi = Xj,  (3) 
xi NLF xj Û
d
 $ XiÎFi(xi), XjÎFj(xj) : Xi Ê Xj.  (4) 
 
Properties. 
These binary relations clearly have the following properties. 
The relation AF is reflexive (xi AF xi) and symmetrical: 
xi AF xj Û xj AF xi Û (xi, xj) Î EF. 
From proposition 1, xI Î EF Û (i,j Î I ⇒ xi AF xj). 
The relation NLF is reflexive (xi NLF xi). 
xi = xj implies xi AF xj, xi NLF xj and xj NLF xi, since {xi}ÎFi(xi), {xj}ÎFj(xj), and hence {xi}= 
{xj}ÎFi(xi)1Fj(xj). 
Finally, xi AF xj ⇒ xi NLF xj and xj NLF xi. But the converse will also be shown, and so: 
 
Proposition 2:  
Two individuals with given allocations are as potentially free as each other if and only if 
each is potentially no less free than the other. That is, 
xi AF xj Û xi NLF xj and xj NLF xi. 
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  The converse relation is not a priori obvious. 
  There results: xI Î EF Û (i,jÎI ⇒ xi NLF xj). 
 
Definition: potentially less free and freer 
 
The definition of NLF entails several further binary relations. 
Given two individuals i and j with respective allocations xi and xj, and for potential freedom 
comparisons, 
-  Individual i is less free than individual j (xi LF xj) when she is not no less free than 
her, 
-  Individual i and individual j are not equally free when each is not as free as the 
other (xi NAF xj Û xj NAF xi), 
-  Individual i is freer than individual j (xiFxj) when she is no less free than her and 
they are not equally free, or, equivalently, i is no less free than j and j is less free 
than i. 
That is, 
xi LF xj Û
d
 no (xi NLF xj) , 
xi NAF xj Û xj NAF xi Û
d
 no (xi AF xj) Û no (xj AF xi) Û xi LF xj or xj LF xi ,   (6) 
xi F xj Û
d
 xi NLF xj and  xi NAF xj Û xi NLF xj and xj LF xi ,  (7) 
in using proposition 2. 
Then, xi NLF xj Û xi AF xj or xi F xj . 
Moreover, individual i can also be no freer than individual j: 
xi NF xj Û
d
 no xi F xj ,  (8) 
which implies 
xi NF xj Û xi LF xj or xj NLF xi Û xi AF xj or xi LF xj . 
The last possible situation in a pair14 is that where the individuals are mutually less free, xi LF 
xj and xj LF xi ,  with its contrary xi NLF xj or xj NLF xi . 
More generaly, a “less free allocation” is an allocation with which each individual is less free 
than each other: i,jÎI ⇒ xiLFxj . Allocations not having this property will eventually be 
interesting. 
 
One  easily  sees  that  the  binary  relations  LF  is  antireflexive,  the  binary  relation  F  is 
antireflexive and antisymmetrical, and the binary relation NF is reflexive. All binary freedom 
relations have a priori no property of transitivity15. 
 
2.4 Characteristic numbers and the freedom comparison of allocations. 
 
These sets of binary relations lead to a number of characteristic numbers and individuals’ 
situations which provide criteria for the selection of allocations. Consider a given population 
with n individuals i, j, etc., and an allocation x = {xi} to this population. The basic numbers 
are numbers of binary relations of a certain type either to, from, or with an individual, or 
globally in the population. We will then denote, for a binary relation f, as 
                                                 
14 That is, without considering substitutions such as the situation of individual i if she had 
allocation xj, as it will be done shortly. 
15 The relations with strict inclusion of the domains of choice will not be used.   13 
ni
+( ) f = number of  j (or of  j ¹i) such that xi f xj,  
ni
-( ) f = number of  j (or of  j ¹i) such that xj f xi, 
ni( )  f = ni
+( ) f -ni
-( ) f , 
N(f) =  + S i n   (f)= S ni
-( ) f = number of relations f.  
We have S ni( ) f  = 0. 
If relation f is symmetrical, ni
+( ) f  = ni
-(f) and ni (f)= 0 : this is the case for f=AF. 
In denoting non-f as Nf, 
ni
+( ) f  + ni
+ N ( ) f = n (or n-1), 
ni
-( ) f  + ni
-(Nf) = n (or n-1), 
ni (Nf) = - ni (f) 
N(Nf) = n
2 – N(f) ( or n×(n-1) – N(f)). 
 
For two relations f, f1 and f2, and n = n , n i i
+ -, or N, n(f1) and n(f2) are not smaller than n (f1 
and f2)  and not larger than n (f1 or f2). 
 
The numbers ni
+( ) f  and ni
-(f) can run from 0 to n, and from 0 to n-1 if f is nonreflexive or if 
the j considered in the definition exclude i. Correspondingly, ni(f) can run from n (or n-1) to 
–n (or – n+1), and N(f) can run from 0 to n
2 or n×(n-1). If f is symmetrical (such as AF or 
NAF) the number of relations f without repetition or reflexion is N '(f) with 0£ N '(f) £ Cn
2 , 
and N '(f) + N '(Nf) = Cn
2 . One has 2N '(AF) £ N(NLF). 
 
xÎEF is equivalent to ni
+( = ( )= LF    n   LF i
- ) 0 for all i, N(LF)=0, N '(NAF)=0, N '(AF)=Cn
2 , and 
other derived values. Hence, the numbers N(LF), N '(NAF), N(LF)/n×(n-1), N '(NAF)/C2
n , or 
∑ |ni(LF)|, which are non-negative, can be taken as “distances” of the allocation to equal-
freedom, or indexes of freedom inequality. Among them N(LF)/n×(n-1) and N '(NAF)/C2
n  are 
between 0 and 1, which they can reach, and they can be taken as indexes of relative freedom 
inequality. The number N(LF) and N(LF)/n×(n-1) are particularly worthy for this purpose 16. 
Similarly, degrees of freedom equality can be measured  as N(NLF) or N '(AF), or as the 
numbers between 0 and 1 N(NLF)/n
2 or N(NLF)/n×(n-1) (according as the retained definition 
of N(NLF) ), or N '(AF)/C2
n . The ideal of equal freedom leads to the selection of allocations x 
which minimize these distances or inequalities, or maximize these degrees of equality, in sets 
of allocations x which can be pairs, possible x, efficient x, the core (see below), etc. 
 
Less free allocations are characterized by N(NLF) = 0 and N(LF) = n×(n-1), and they satisfy 
N '(AF) = 0. 
 
Consider  individuals’  situations  with  LF  or  NLF  as  f.  Then,  ni
+( ) LF is  the  number  of 
individuals j such that xiLFxj , and  ni
-( ) LF is the number of individuals j such that xjLFxi . 
Individuals i such that ni
+( ) LF = 0 are those who are less free than no other (no less free than 
all others): they are called the freest individuals. Individuals i such that ni
-( ) LF = 0 are those 
                                                 
16 A number similar to N(LF) is used as an “envy index” by Feldman and Kirman (1974).   14 
such that no other is less free than them (all others are no less free then them): they are called 
the least free individuals. Such individuals may exist or not (see next section). Among the 
freest,  those  with  the  largest  ni
-( ) LF (number  of  people  less  free  than  them)  are  the 
maximally freest. Among the least free, those with the largest ni
+( ) LF (number of people to 
whom they are less free) are the minimally least free. A freest individual i with ni
-( ) LF >0 is 
a strictly freest individual (at least one other is less free than her, and the individual is freer 
than  these  persons).  A  least  free  individual  i  with  ni
+( ) LF >0  is  a  strictly  least  free  
individual (she is less free than at least one other, and these others are freer than her). An 
individual can be both a freest and a least free, but this cannot occur if she is strictly freest or 
strictly least free. 
 
The globally least free and globally freest are the individuals with highest and lowest ni(LF), 
respectively. They are not a priori least free or freest, but if they are, they more specifically 
are minimally less free and maximally freest, respectively. 
 
The “less and most as free” individuals are the individuals with lowest and highest ni
+( ) AF = 
ni
-( ) AF , respectively. 
 
For any allocation x, there always exist globally least free and globally freest individuals, and 
less as free and most as free individuals. 
 
For xÎEF, all individuals are at once freest, least free, maximally freest, minimally least free, 
globally freest and least free, and less and most as free. Hence, in particular, the distinctions 
of least free, minimally least free, and globally least free can be used to define principles of 
maximin  and  leximin:  one  can  choose  allocations  x  which  provide  a  better  situation  as 
regards the freedom of these individuals, or which minimize their number, in comparisons 
between alternative allocations. The following sections will provide a number of examples of 
such principles17. 
 
Moreover,  all  the  definitions  of  comparisons  of  individual  freedoms  can  apply  to  the 
comparison of the freedoms of the same individual in different situations, in the present case 
of her potential freedoms with different individual allocations, as binary relations between, 
say, xi and  xi
'. We will see that  x F x x LF x i i i i
' ' Û (section 4.3). 
 
Then, allocation x is said to freedom-dominate allocation  x'={ } xi
'  when xi NLFxi
'  for all i  
and xiFxi
' for at least one i. Clearly, this binary relation between allocations is antireflexive 
and antisymmetrical (as the relation F is). A possible allocation which is not so dominated by 
other possible allocations is a priori to be sought (this will shortly be justified). 
 
Another comparison is majority. The same result is obtained whether the binary relation used 
is NLF or F. For a binary relation f and two allocations x and  x' to the same population, 
denote as N x x ( , , ) ' f  the number of i such that xifxi
' . Allocation x wins by majority over 
                                                 
17 Other analyses also use the “median” (in a particular sense) individuals for each relations, 
that is, for relation f, the individuals i such that the absolute value |ni(f)| is the lowest, for f=LF (or 
NLF), or F.   15 
allocation  x'  for  relation  f  when  N x x ( , , ) ' f > N x x ( , , ) ' f ,  or    n x x ( , , ) ' f =
d
  N x x ( , , ) ' f –
N x x ( , , ) ' f >  0.  But  , , ( ' x x n NLF)  º  , , ( ' x x n F)  as  one  easily  sees. This  binary relation is 
antireflexive and antisymmetrical. 
 
3. FREEDOM-ORDERED ALLOCATIONS 
 
The following concepts, structures, and properties will be important, notably for defining the 
various concepts of maximin and leximin in freedom. 
 
3.1 Embedded domains 
 
Definition: freedom-ordered allocations. 
An allocation is freedom-ordered when the individuals can be ranked in such a way that each 
is no less free than each individual of lower rank. 
That is, FO denoting the set of freedom-ordered allocations (for any population I), 
xIÎFO Û
d
{$ (p , I ): i,j Î I and i p j ⇒ [xi NLF xj Û $ XiÎFi(xi), XjÎFj(xj) : Xi ÊXj]}. 
Clearly, EFÌFO. 
Clearly also, a suballocation of a freedom-ordered allocation is freedom-ordered: 
xIÎFO and JÌI ⇒ xJÎFO. 
 
The following property will be shown: 
 
Proposition 3 
An allocation is freedom-ordered if and only if it can result from individuals’ choices in an 
embedded profile of individual domains of choice. 
That is, 
xIÎFO Û FI(xI) 1 EM ¹ f Û $ XIÎFI(xI) and (p,I): (i,j Î I and i p j⇒ Xi Ê Xj ). 
 
The  difference  with  the  definition  is  that  the  same  domain  of  choice  is  used  for  each 
individual in each pairwise comparison, while this is not a priori the case in the definition. 
Proposition 3 says that if xI  is freedom-ordered, the same domain Xi can be taken for defining 
the relation NLF for each pair including i. The existence of such a freedom-ordered profile of 
embedded possible domains obviously implies the definition, but the converse is not obvious. 
 
Proposition 3 and the definition of a freedom-ordered allocation respectively correspond to 
the definition of an equal-freedom allocation and proposition 1. 
 
Clearly also, if JÌI and xIÎFO, the projection on J (or restriction to J) of an embedded 
profile of proposition 3, XI , for the population I, also is such an embedded profile XJ for the 
subpopulation J with the suballocation xJ. 
 
If the number of individuals is finite and is n, the number of strict orderings of the individuals 
which can define a freedom-ordered allocation, n, varies from 0 to n! The case n=0 means 
that the allocation is not freedom-ordered (for instance if the individuals of one pair are each 
less free than the other – a necessary and sufficient condition will shortly be shown). The 
case n=n! corresponds to equal-freedom allocations. The number n for a given allocation can 
be taken as a degree of freedom ordering of this allocation. 
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Moreover, for xIÎFO, and with n=|I|, [n×(n-1)]/2 £ N(NLF) £ n×(n-1) (excluding relations xi 
NLF xi) and 0 £ N(LF) £ [n×(n-1)]/2. 
 
3.2 Least free and freest 
 
Definition 
An individual is 
- least free  if no other is less free than her, 
- freest if she is less free than no other, 
- strictly least free if she is least free and no freest (hence one other is freer than her), 
- strictly freest if she is freest and no least free (hence she is freer than one other). 
 
Clearly, 
- Least free individuals are equally free, 
- Freest individuals are equally free, 
- An individual freer than a strictly least free is not least free, 
- A strictly freest individual is freer than non-freest individuals only, 
- An individual both least free and freest is as free as each individual – all individuals 
are in this case if and only if the allocation is equal-freedom. 
 
The following property of existence will be shown: 
 
Proposition 4 
With a freedom-ordered allocation to a finite number of individuals, there exist least free 
individuals and freest individuals, and, if the allocation is not equal-freedom, there exist 
strictly least free individuals and strictly freest individuals. The latter are respectively the 
least free and the freest individuals for the suballocation to the set of individuals minus the 
individuals who are both least free and freest. 
 
Proposition 4 applies to all suballocations of the considered allocation, and to all 
suballocations to a finite number of individuals of any freedom-ordered allocation. 
 
More generally, each least free and freest individual can be respectively characterized 
by the number of (non-least free) individuals who are freer than her and of (non-freest) 
individuals to which they are freer. This establishes a hierarchy among least free and among 
freest. The extremes are the minimally least free who are the least free individuals with the 
largest number of (non-least free) individuals who are freer than them, and the maximally 
freest who are the freest individuals with the largest number of (nonfreest) individuals to 
which they are freer (the other two extremes of these numbers are less interesting). 
 
3.3 The layer structure 
 
The receivers of a freedom-ordered allocation can be partitioned into ranked layer 
subsets of equally free individuals who are no less free than individuals of lower layers and 
such that individuals of higher layers one no less free than them. The individuals of the same 
layer can have identical domains in the profiles of embedded domains of individual choice. 
There may be a number of possible such arrangements. Two are particularly important. One 
is constituted in considering the least free individuals, then the least free of the remaining set, 
and so on. The other is constituted in considering the freest individuals, then the freest of the 
remaining set, and so on.   17 
 
In the first, “least free”, structure, each individual is freer than at least one individual 
of the immediately lower layer (except for the least free individuals). Indeed, is this were not 
the case she would be in this lower layer. Specifically, when this lower layer is constituted in 
becoming the set of least free individuals, since the considered individual is not included in 
it, at least one  individual not yet discarded is less free than her. And since she becomes least 
free when this lower layer is also discarded, these individuals belong to this lower layer. 
Then, since she also is no less free than these individuals, she is freer than them. The highest 
layer is constituted of the strictly freest individuals who are freer than at least one individual 
of the immediately lower layer. 
 
In the second, “freest”, structure, for each individual there is at least one individual of 
the immediately higher layer who is freer than her (except for the freest individuals). Indeed, 
if this were not the case this individual would be in this higher layer. The reasoning parallels 
that of the previous case. The lowest layer is constituted of the strictly least free individuals 
for which at least one of the individual of the second lowest layer is freer. 
 
3.4 Less free cycles 
 
Definition 
For an allocation, a less free cycle is a closed sequence (cycle) of individuals such that each 
is less free than the next. That is, for xI  it is a set i,j,k,…,R ÎI such that xi LF xj , xj LF xk ,…,  
xR LF xi . The following property will be shown: 
 
Proposition 5 
1) There is no less free cycle with a freedom-ordered allocation. 
2) If there is no less free cycle and the number of individuals is finite, the allocation is 
freedom-ordered. 
 
Hence, with a finite number of individuals, the properties of freedom-order and of the 
absence of less free cycles are equivalent. 
 
3.5 Improving permutations and efficiency. 
 
A  freedom-improving  permutation  is  a  permutation  of  their  individual  allocations 
among  the  individuals  of  population  I  such  that,  if  p(i)ÎI  denotes  the  individual  whose 
allocation goes to individual iÎI, then xiLFxp(i) if p(i) ¹ i; that is, each individual whose 
allocation changes becomes potentially freer (x LFx i i
' Û  xi
' Fxi for comparisons of the same 
individual’s potential freedom with two different allocations, as it will shortly be shown). 
 
For a given allocation xI and a freedom-improving permutation p, the i such that 
p(i)¹i constitute a less free cycle if |I|<¥. Hence,  since xIÎFO implies that there is no less 
free  cycle,  xIÎFO  and  |I|<¥  imply  that  there  is  no  freedom-improving  permutation. 
Conversely, if |I|<¥, the absence of possible freedom-improving permutations implies that of 
less free cycles, and hence implies that xI is freedom-ordered; however, the consequences of 
this latter relation depends on the actual possibilities of permutations. We will thus make this 
issue explicit, in anticipating here on the issues which will be fully discussed in section 6. 
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The relation “less free” now considered will be, if the individuals have different domains of 
possible allocations, xiÎDi for individual i, the case where each is entitled to her possibilities 
and hence is accountable for their limitation. Then, it will be shown in section 6 that for this 
LF, denoted as LF
+ and qualified as “realistic”, 
xi NLF
+xj Û xiRixj or xjÏDi , 
xi LF
+xj Û xjPixi and xjÎDi , 
and, for xiÎDi, 
xi NLF
+xi





'  Û x x i i
'F+ Û x Px i i i
'  and xi
' ÎDi. 
 
The case with no explicit Di and the case where all Di are identical amount to the same (one 
can  take  A  =  Di).  They  are  a  particular  case  of  the  previous  case.  But,  conversely,  the 
previous case can be reduced to that with identical Di in replacing the orderings Ri with the 
derived “sour grapes” orderings  Ri
'. 
 
Denote as D = {xIÎA
|I|  : (xIÎD Û xiÎDi, "iÎI)}. There may be other constraints on xI, 
denoted as xIÎP. The total limitation on xI is xI Î D1P. 
 
If Z Î  (A
|I|) is a set of possible xI, denote as E(Z) Í Z the set of corresponding Pareto-
efficient xI. 
 
Then, xI Î E(D1P) Û xI Î D1P and for no  xI
' Î D1P,  xi
' Rixi, " iÎI, and  xi
'Pixi for at least 
one iÎI. But, since xi,xi
' Î Di , xi
' Rixi Ûxi
' NLF
+xi , and xi





i x . 
Therefore, (Pareto-)efficiency is identical when expressed with freedom comparisons or with 
preferences as they usually are. We will just say efficient and efficiency. 
 
Assume domain P to be symmetrical, that is, xIÎPÛ {xp(i)}ÎP for all permutations p of the 
set  I. When considering  permutations, the only  possible remaining limitations can solely 
come from domain D. 
 
Hence, if there is a freedom-improving permutation p, the relations 
xi LF
+xp(i) Û xp(i) Pi xi and xp(i) Î Di 
for all i¹ p (i) imply that 
1)  the permutation is actually possible since xp(i) Î Di,, 
2)  xp(i) Pi xi for all these individuals i. 
 
Therefore, if a freedom-improving permutation exists from allocation xI, 
1)  this allocation is not efficient, 
2)  this allocation is not in the “core” in the sense that the group of individuals such 
that p(i) ¹ i can rearrange their allocations so as to be all both potentially freer and 
better  off.  Since  the  core  is  efficient,  property  1  implies  the  intrinsically 
meaningful property 2. 
 
Therefore, if allocation xI  is efficient, or is in the core, there is no freedom-improving 
permutation, and hence, if |I|<¥ , there is no less free cycle, and therefore xI Î FO. 
 
The following property thus holds:   19 
 
Proposition 6 : 
For a finite number of individuals, if nothing can prevent permutations except individual 
possibilities, and if individuals are entitled to their own possibilities or accountable for their 
limitations,  or  if  they  have  identical  domains  of  possibilities,  then  efficient  and  core 
allocations are freedom-ordered. 
 
This is “realistic” freedom ranking, which amounts to the simple one if the individuals 
have  identical  domains.  In  brief,  efficient  and  core  allocations  are  realistically  freedom-





The best allocation certainly has to be efficient, for moral reasons, notably based on 
freedom, which will be recalled in section 4.1. Allocations may also have to be in the core, 
for two possible reasons, based on the fact that allocations not in the core can be destroyed by 
a  unanimous  “blocking  coalition”  rearanging  its  individual  allocations.  Indeed,  if  the 
individuals of a blocking coalition perform this rearangement, the allocation from which they 
do it is not stable, and the relevant concept of a possible allocation problably has to require 
that this allocation is stable. But there are two possible reasons for such actions of blocking 
coalitions not to be prevented. First, preventing this action may just not be possible. Second, 
preventing this action may be banned for a moral reason because subsets of individuals have 
the right to agree among themselves, exchange promises of action, and so transform their 
allocations.  Moreover,  this  latter  right  may  be  embodied  a  priori  in  the  selection  of 
allocations,  which  thus  a  priori  implements  its  possible  effects,  without  the  individuals 
actually considering its use (and the actual agreements may be costly, difficult, or impaired 
for any reason) – the ethics then is one of a “liberal social contract” implementation of these 
rights18. 
 
There may be no equal-freedom allocation which is possible, or efficient, or in the 
core. One  then has to replace equal-freedom by a second-best freedom egalitarian principle 
respecting this constraint. The fact that efficient and core allocations are freedom-ordered 
provides  opportunities  in  the  family  of  maximins  or  leximins,  which  will  be  closely 
considered. We will then first focus on the least free, or strictly least free, or minimally least 
free  individuals. However, there can be several such individuals. But then they are equally 
free, and this permits the comparison. 
 
Indeed,  if for two different  populations I,J Í N allocations xIÎA
|I| and yJÎA
|I| are 
equal-freedom, one can define “as free as” and “no less free than” for these allocations as, 
respectively, 
xI AF yJ Û
d
 EI(xI) 1 EJ(yJ) ¹ Æ 
and 
xI NLF yJ Û
d
 $XÎEI(xI), YÎ EJ(yJ) :X Ê Y. 
 
It will then be shown that: 
                                                 
18 See Kolm 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1996a.   20 
 
Proposition 7 
  If  xI, yJ Î EF, 
  xI AF yJ Û xI NLF yJ and yJ NLF xI . 
 
Then, for a given population, denote, for each x ={xi}ÎFO, as M the set of least free 
(or  strictly  least  free  or  minimally  least  free)  individuals,  and  as  xM  the  corresponding 
suballocation of x. Another such allocation  x'similarly has a  M 'and a  xM'
' . Let E and C 
respectively  denote  the  sets  of  efficient  and  core  allocations,  with  CÍEÍFO.  Then,  G 
denoting E or C, a corresponding freedom maximin can be defined as xÎG such that  x'ÎG 
⇒ xM NLFxM
' . All such x have equally free xM. There are, however, a number of other 
related  and  relevant  concepts  of  freedom  maximins  and  leximins  (including  some  which 
secure uniqueness of the solution). Section 5 will provide their definitions, comparisons, and 
properties. 
 





The  foregoing  comparisons  of  meaningful  potential  freedoms  can  be  expresed  in 
terms of the individuals’ preferences, and of the individuals’ possibilities when they differ. 
The cases with different individuals’ possibilities will be explicitly considered in section 6. 




  8-1:  xi LF xj Û xjPixi , 
  8-2:  xi NLF xj Û xiRixj , 
  8-3:   xi F xj Û xiRixj and xiPjxj , 
  8-4:  xi NF xj Û xjPixi or xjRjxi , 
  8-5:  xIÎEF Û (i,jÎI ⇒ xiRixj) , 
  8-6:   xi AF xj Û xiRixj and xjRjxi . 
 
Proposition 8 proves propositions 1 and 2: 8-5 and 8-6 entail proposition 1, and 8-2 
and 8-6 entail proposition 2. 
 
4.2 Meanings of equal-freedom 
 
  Proposition  8-5  reveals  that  the  equal-freedom  principle  with  no  limitations  (or 
identical limitations) in individuals’ possibilities amounts to none other than the classical 
criterion that no individual prefers any other’s allocation to her own. In fact, this possible 
equality of liberty constitutes the basic and most important and meaningful reason for the 
ethical worth and for the importance of this property. Note that this criterion is often used   21 
without saying why it is important19. However, two types de justificatory notions seem to 
exist in the mind of people who consider it, and others can be suggested. 
 
On the one hand, this criterion is often presented as a directly meaningful type of 
equity or fairness. But what is, then, the underlying rationale? Is there an ideal equalizand – 
the metaethical theory of justice suggests there should be one –, and, then, if this equality is 
not achieved, what is the reason for this ? Economists are prone to emphasize that solely 
ordinal preferences are used. This suggests that preferences, utility, satisfaction, etc… would 
be the ideal relevant end-value, but that difficulty in being more specific than ordinal and 
independent preferences constitutes the obstacle. Moreover, in this evaluation of allocations, 
the sole characteristic of individuals are their preference orderings. And if the individuals 
have  identical  preference  orderings,  then  the  application  of  the  principle  entails  that  the 
individual allocations are indifferent among themselves, with this ordering. But rationality 
implies  equal  treatment  of  equals20,  and  hence  the  objective  seems  to  be  the  level  of 
preferences.  But  indifference  with  the  common  ordering  does  not  mean  same  level  of 
satisfaction (though the identity of preference orderings would be quite fortuitous if it were 
not derived from some identical satisfaction level function21 – this satisfaction would then be 
interpersonally comparable, but it can remain ordinal, and hence be co-ordinal). In the end, 
such a conception probably sees personal satisfaction, “welfare”, or happiness as the relevant 
item for the direct evaluation, with the obstacle being the notional non-comparability across 
individuals. But probably more can be introduced in the way of this comparability22. 
 
Another idea would be that the items directly relevant for justice are individuals’ 
allocations,  and  the  ideal  is  equal  individual  allocations.  This  would  result  from  the 
irrelevance, for the considered direct evaluation, of individuals’ eudemonistic capacities only, 
for  a  reason  of  individual  entitlement  to  these  capacities  or  accountability  for  their 
shortcomings, or of  privacy of the feeling of satisfaction. But this ideal generally is not 
Pareto-efficient  because  of  differences  in  individuals’  preferences,  and  the  considered 
criterion would be a second-best form which may permit efficiency. The criterion is indeed 
satisfied,  in  particular,  by  identical  individuals’  allocations.  But  the  introduction  of 
preferences  should  be  justified  (the  various  reasons  for  Pareto-efficiency  will  shortly  be 
recalled). One may consider that equal individual allocations also constitute a particular case 
of identical domain of choice (the case where these domains vanish to a singleton), and hence 
the  extension  of  equality  in  allocations  which  may  permit  Pareto-efficiency  would  be 
identical domains of choice, which leeds to the principle as shown above. 
 
But a common suggestion relates this principle to an absence of envy. Tinbergen 
(1946) discusses this aspect, and the logical relations with envy and jealousy are noted in 
                                                 
19 This accounts for the variations in the names given to this criterion which was successively 
called “the exchange principle” by Tinbergen (1946), “equity” by Foley (1967), Kolm (1971) and 
others,  “fairness”  when  associated  with  Pareto-efficiency  by  Varian  (1974),  “super-fairness”  by 
Baumol  (1986),  and  “envy-freeness”  by  many  later  authors.  “Equity”  can  stand  for  Equal 
Instrumental Independent Liberty. 
20 The fullest presentation of this point is in Kolm 1998, foreword, section 5. 
21  The  exception  to  this  remark  would  be  that  individuals  solely  care  about  one 
unidimensional item being “more” or “less” (possibly, but not necessarily, the quantity of a good), 
and the considered allocations xi are the bundle of factors which determine this item. 
22 The fullest analysis of this suggestion is in Kolm 1998 (translation of 1971), foreword 
1997.   22 
Kolm (1971). More recently, this principle came to be often referred to as no-envy or envy-
freeness, though users of this term usually do not state explicitly whether they actually refer 
to a sentiment of envy, or just to the formal structure of the criterion. The reference to actual 
envy  has  sometimes  been  suggested.  And  envy  is  both  a  standardly  morally  condemned 
sentiment and a painful one. The moral condemnation, however, would rather lead to discard 
this  sentiment  for  normative  considerations23.  Yet,  this  painfulness  and  this  moral 
condemnation hold for the most common type of envy, or strong envy, and this sentiment 
cannot be described by the preferences considered here, since an envious person is jointly 
influenced both by what she has and by what the people she envies have. And, indeed, a long 
line of studies have modelled envy as such a consumption externality24. Rarer and milder 
types of envy (like “I envy your youth”) would take us back to the previous conception of the 
criterion as a direct equity concept. 
 
Hence, the essential value of this principle is its derivation from freedom justice. This 
leads to an apparent paradox: equity is solely expressed in terms of individuals’ preferences, 
while its essential value rests on the fact that preferences are discarded from relevant direct 
concern.  This  essential  value  is  the  reverse  of  the  common  conception  which  holds  this 
criterion to be valuable because it solely is expressed in terms of individuals’ preferences, 
indeed of ordinal preferences without interpersonal comparaison. This principle is basically 
rational first-best eleutheristic (or freedom) justice, rather than second-best eudemonistic (or 
satisfaction)  justice  shunning  interpersonal  comparison  of  preferences  –  or  second-best 
allocational justice trying to avoid inefficiency. Individual preferences then appear in the 
classical expression of the principle solely because the considered situational variables (the 
allocations) differ from the directly (or ultimately) justice-relevant variables (the freedoms), 
and individuals’ (potential) choices translate equal freedom in the space of allocations. 
 
4.3 Comparison of potential freedoms of the same individual. 
 
In the potential freedom comparisons, the two individuals with their allocations can be the 
same  individual  with  allocations  which  can  be  different.  The  relations  then  compare  the 
potential freedoms of the same individual with two allocations. Formally, this amounts to the 
two individuals having the same preferences and personal possibilities, and presently solely 
the same preferences since personal possibilities are a priori assumed to be identical (the 
more general case will be considered in section 6). Hence, if xi and  xi
'  are two individual 
allocations of individual i, substituting  xi
'  for xj and Ri for Rj in proposition 8 provides the 
correspondence between potential freedom and preferences for the same individual, which 
turns out to simply be: 
xi Fxi
'  Û xi
' LFxi Û xiPixi
' , 
xiNLFxi
'  Û xi
' NFxi Û xiRixi
' , 
xiAFxi




Proposition 9  
                                                 
23  And  to  replace  individual  preferences  in  which  this  envy  is  correctly  modelled  by 
“laundered”  preferences  where  the  effect  of  this  sentiment  has  been  erased,  which  is  technically 
possible (see Kolm 1991b, 1995). 
24 See the history in Kolm 1995.   23 
For the same individual, potential freedom comparisons and preferences amount to the same. 
 
Hence, each individual prefers to be freer, is indifferent between being as free, prefers or is 
indifferent  to  be  no  less  free,  and  conversely,  with  this  purely  choice-instrumental  and 
potential  freedom.  The  same  result  will  hold  for  the  cases  where  individuals  can  have 
different possibilities if one assumes xi,xi
' ÎDi, since these differences do not intervene in 




One consequence is that the concepts of unanimous improvement and of Pareto efficiency are 
identical when expressed in terms of possible freedoms and in terms of preferences as they 
classically  are.  A  possible  allocation  is  Pareto  efficient  when  an  individual  can  become 
potentially freer solely if another becomes potentially less free. 
 
Hence, Pareto efficiency is required for two reasons by a social ethic based on freedom. The 
first reason depends on the type of concepts used here: if a possible allocation is not Pareto 
efficient, all individuals can be made (potentially) freer, with the possible exception of some 
(but not all) who remain as free. The second reason is general. Indeed, if a possible allocation 
is not Pareto efficient, there exists another possible allocation that all individuals prefer to 
choose, with possible indifference for some individuals – but  not for all. Hence, Pareto 
inefficiency  constitutes  an  unnecessary  constraint  on  society,  whatever  its  reason.  Thus, 
seeking higher (in inclusion sense) actual collective freedom requires Pareto efficiency  25. 
Therefore, for all reasons we will henceforth require Pareto efficiency with  priority. For 
short, we will just write efficiency and efficient. 
 
It may be that no efficient allocation is equal-freedom. It may also be, more generally, that no 
possible  allocation  is  equal-freedom,  which  implies  that  no  efficient  allocation  is  equal-
freedom. This is a priori due to limitations in divisibility or in transferability of the items in 
individual allocations26. These properties are rather frequent occurrences. Their reasons may 
be physical: certain goods may be indivisible, or cutting them down may destroy  them or 
make them useless or much less useful; divisible and transferable goods may be in short 
supply; personal capacities are not directly transferable. But these limitations may also have a 
social  cause  which  has  priority  such  as  nondivision,  inalienability,  minimal  or  maximal 
allocation,  due  to  moral,  other norms,  politics, or other  power. Limitations of the set of 
individual allocations that an individual can have will later be explicitly considered (section 
6), with different ethical treatments according as whether the individuals are, or are not, 
deemed accountable for their limitations and entitled to their possibilities. But we will begin 
with  discarding  this  consideration,  for  reason  of  simplicity  in  presentation,  because  the 
concepts extend to the cases with explicit limitations, and because, for the case where the 
individuals  are  accountable  for  their  limitations  or  entitled  to  their  possibilities,  all  the 
properties of the simple presentations will have analogs and, indeed, the full structure can 
formally be reduced to the simple presentation. 
 
                                                 
25 If the inefficeincy is due to individuals’ interaction, this justification of imposing efficiency 
relates to a notion of potential freedom or “liberal social contract”. 
26 Efficient equal-freedom allocations exist with perfectly divisible and transferable goods 
and convex possibility sets and preferences (see Kolm 1971, 1995, 1996b).   24 
With  no  efficient  equal-freedom  allocation,  second-best  eleutheristic  justice  should  be 
defined, which will  be an efficient second-best freedom egalitarianism. If, moreover, the 
allocation should be in the core because unanimous rearangements within coalitions, which 
would destroy the solution, cannot be prevented, or should not be prevented because they are 
a right (free exchange), or even should a priori be imagined for the same reason, then the 
search for an allocation is further restricted to the core, a subset of efficient allocations. 
Hence, the domain in which the solution is sought is either the set of efficient allocations E, 
or the core C. We will write it E for short (and because the core becomes the set of efficient 
and  of  possible  allocations  if  the  destructive  –  or  potentially  destructive  –  actions  of 
coalitions  are  classified  within  the  constraints  of  the  problem).  Since  the  social  ethic 
positively values the considered freedom, as the individuals do, and since more or less free is 
defined both across individuals and for each individual, it is natural to seek solutions in the 
family of maximins. Efficient freedom maximins will thus now be defined. For short, the 
qualificative  “potential”  referring  to  freedoms  will  henceforth  remain  implicit.  These 




Practically,  it  is  not  uncommon  that,  in  the  actually  possible  allocations,  the  least  free 
individuals are the same ones (no other individual would prefer to be in their place). If there 
is  solely  one  such  least  free  individual,  then  her  preferences  constitute  a  social  ethical 
ordering, and the maximal elements of this preordering constitute the solution. However, 
more generally, the least free individuals (as defined in section 2.4) may not be the same in 
various  efficient  allocations,  and  there  may  be  several  least  free  individuals  in  a  given 
allocation. In this latter case, the minimally least free individuals may be considered, and 
there may be solely one of them in each allocation, possibly the same one whose preferences 
can then become the social ethical ordering. We will successively consider the cases where 
each efficient allocation has solely one least free (or minimally least free) individual who, 
however, can vary from one allocation to the other, and the more general case where each 
efficient allocation can have several least free individuals. In all this section, least free can 
alternatively be replaced by minimally least free. 
 
5.1 Minimal freedom comparisons with single least free. 
 
Definitions 
Consider a given population, not explicitely denoted, of individuals i, with allocations x={xi}. 
Least free (and minimally least free) individuals exist in freedom-ordered allocations, which 
are the case in the conditions stated in proposition 6. We now consider allocations with single 
least free (or minimally least free) individuals, denoted as m. From proposition 4, if x is 
freedom-ordered and not equal-freedom, individual m also is strictly least free, and hence it is 
not freest and xj F xm for some j ¹m. Let x and  x'  denote two such allocations, with m and 
m'   as  respective  such  individuals.  Minimal  comparisons  of  x  and  x'   are  comparisons 
between xm and  xm
'
'  . The freedom comparaisons (or their expression in terms of preferences) 
are considered. Then, allocation x being minimally as free as, no lest free than, less free than, 
freer than, and no freer than allocation x' are respectively denoted and defined as : 
xMAFx'  Û
d
 xmAFxm'   Û xmRmxm
'









'  Û xm Rmxm
'





'  Û xm
'





'  Û xm Rmxm
'







'  Û xm
'




' xm . 
 
The relation MAF is symmetrical, and the relation MF is antisymmetrical. 
 
From the definitions, 
xMAFx'   Û  xMNLFx'  and x' MNLFx , 
xMFx'   Û  xMNLFx'  and x' MLFx , 
xMNLFx'   Û  xMAFx'  or xMFx'  , 
xMNFx'   Û  xMLFx'  or x' MNLFx , 
xMNLFx'   Û  no xMLFx'  , 
  xMNFx'   Û     no xMFx' . 
 
If individuals m and  m' are the same individual, the minimal ranking of x and  x'  is as this 
individual’s  preferences  or  potential  freedom.  But  even  when  they  are  not  the  same 
individual, the relation MF will be shown to entail the following property: 
 
Proposition 10 
With unique least free individuals, such an individual becomes freer with a minimally freer 
allocation, and, more generally, with an allocation such that the present one is minimally 
less free than it. 
That is, x' MFx ⇒ xMLFx'  ⇒ xm
' Pmxm . 
 
5.2 Freedom maximin with single least free. 
 
Definitions. 
Consider a given population with allocations x={xi}. Assume the efficient allocations (set E) 
have  single  least  free  (or  minimally  least  free)  individuals denoted as m (and as  m' for 
allocations  x' ) – their reason for having least free individuals can be that they are freedom-
ordered for the reasons noted earlier. There are four related concepts of efficient freedom 
maximin (EFM), respectively built up with the relations minimally (M) no less free (NLF), 
freer (F), less free (LF), and no freer (NF). These efficient maximin are xÎE such that, for all 
other x'ÎE, respectively: 
1)  For a No less free efficient freedom maximin (NLFEFM), 
  xMNLFx' Û xmRmxm
'
'  ; 
2)  For a Less free efficient freedom maximin (LFEFM), 
  x' MLFx Û xmPm’xm
'
' ; 
3)  For a Freer efficient freedom maximin (FEFM), 
    xMFx' Û xMNLFx'  and x' MLFx Û xmRmxm
'





4)  For a No freer efficient freedom maximin (NFEFM), 
    x' MNFxÛ xMNLFx'  or x' MLFx Û xmRmxm
'





The following properties directly result or will be shown:   26 
 
Proposition 11 
1)  A FEFM is unique. 
2)  There cannot be a NLFEFM and a LFEFM distinct. 
3)  The sets of FEFM and of NFEFM are respectively the intersection and the union 
of the sets of the NLFEFM and of the LFEFM. Hence, the implications of these 
properties are 
NLFEFM 
FEFM    NFEFM. 
  LFEFM 
4)  The  least  free  individuals  of  all  NLFEFM  are  equally  free.  All  NLFEFM  are 
minimally as free as one another. 
5)  The least free individuals of the allocations which are not a certain LFEFM are 
freer with and prefer this LFEFM. 
6)  In particular, the least free individuals of the allocations which are not the FEFM 
if it exists, are freer with and prefer the FEFM. 
7)  The least free individuals of the allocations which are not NLFEFM are freer with 
and prefer certain other efficient allocations. 
 
The  maximin  choice  should  be  the  FEFM  if  it  exists.  It  has,  indeed,  more  dominating 
properties over other allocations than other NFEFM, and no such property less. If there is no 
FEFM, then a NFEFM is to be chosen. NLFEFM or LFEFM have a certain advantage of 
consistency over other NFEFM : the binary relations with the other allocations, which define 
them, are of the same type. Only one of these two categories can exist. NLFEFM allocations 
are all minimally equally free. The LFEFM allocations have the advantage that each makes 
freer, and is preferred by, the least free individuals in each other allocation. When no single 
allocation  is  selected  in  this  way,  a  leximin  can  be  applied  in  dropping  the  least  free 
individuals and their allocations in the possibly selected allocations, and in comparing the 
second least free individuals, and so on. 
 
Several least free individuals. 
 
However,  freedom-ordered  allocations  can  in  general  have  several  least  free  individuals. 
Concepts of freedom maximin thus demand that the freedom of these least free groups be 
compared.  These  groups  are  constituted  with  individuals  who  generally  differ  across 
allocations, and whose number also generally differ. But these least free groups are each 
equal-freedom groups. This permits one to define the needed freedom comparisons. 
 
5.3 Freedom comparisons of different equal-freedom groups. 
 
Let xi,yiÎA denote individual allocations for iÎN, I,JÍN denote two groups of individuals, xI 
={xi}iÎIÎA
|I| and yJ ={yi}iÎJÎA
|J| denote two allocations for these groups respectively, and 
assume each of these allocations to be equal-freedom: xI, yJÎEF, that is,     EI (xI) ¹ Æ and 
EJ(yj) ¹Æ. The comparison of (potential) freedoms of group I with allocation xI and of group 
J with allocation xJ, initiated in section 3.6, will be completed with other relevant concepts. 
The following comparisons will be defined: equal freedom (as free as: AF), no less free than 
(NLF), and weakly, strongly, lower intermediately, and upper intermediately, less free than 
and freer than (respectively WLF, SLF, TR LF, Tu LF for less free than, and WF, SF, TR F, Tu 
F for freer than). The first two have been noted:   27 
 
Definitions: equally free and no less free. 
xI AF yJ Û
d
 EI(xI) 1 EJ(yJ) ¹Æ. 
xI NLF yJ Û
d
 $ XÎEI(xI) and YÎEJ(yJ): X Ê Y. 
 
The relation AF is symmetrical. The following relation between these two binary relations 
have been noted: 
 
Proposition 7 
For xI, yJÎEF,  
xI AFyJ Û xI NLFyJ and yJ NLFxI . 
 
The direct relation is obvious from the definitions,  but the converse is not. The relation 
between these group freedom comparisons and individuals’ preferences (and hence potential 
freedoms) will be shown to be: 
 
Proposition 12: preference characterizations. 
For xI, yJ ÎEF, 
1)  xI AF yJ Û (iÎI, jÎJ ⇒ xi AF yj), 
2)  xI NLF yJ Û (iÎI, jÎJ ⇒ xi Ri yj). 
 
Proposition 12 entails proposition 7. 
 
Definition: weakly less free and weakly freer 
xI WLF yJ Û
d
 no xI NLF yJ, 
xI WF yJ Û
d
 xI NLF yJ and no xI AF yJ, or, equivalently, 
   xI NLF yJ and yJ WLF xI . 
 
The preference characterization of WLF and WF is a corollary of that of NLF in proposition 
12, namely, for the former one, 
xI WLF yJ Û$ iÎI and jÎJ: yj Pi xi . 
This leads to the introduction of three stronger concepts of less free and freer: “strongly” (S) 
and two “intermediately” (TR  and Tu where R and u respectively stand for lower and upper): 
xI SLF yJ  Û (iÎI, jÎJ ⇒ yj Pi xi), 
xI TR LF yJ  Û [iÎI ⇒ ($jÎJ: yj Pi xi)], 
xI Tu LF yJ  Û [jÎJ ⇒ ($iÎI: yj Pi xi)]. 
The relations strongly freer (SF) and intermediately freer are then defined as: 
xI SF yJ Û
d
 xI NLF yJ and yJ SLF xI , 
xI TR F yJ Û
d
 xI NLF yJ and yJ TR LF xI , 
xI Tu F yJ Û
d
 xI NLF yJ and yJ Tu LF xI . 
The preference characterization of the four relations “freer” (F) result from those, just noted, 
of the relations NLF and of the four relations “less free” (LF). 
From these definitions for both LF and F respectively, the strong relations (S) imply both 
intermediate relations (TR and Tu) and any of these three implies the weak relations (W). 
All the relations “freer” are antisymmetrical.   28 
Finally, these four relations “freer” provide by negation four relations “no freer”, which are 
shown to be: 
-  for W, TR and Tu: xI AF yJ or xI WLF yJ, or, equivalently, yJ NLF xI or xI WLF yJ, 
-  for S: xI WLF yJ or ($ iÎI and jÎJ: yj Rj xi). 
But other concepts of “no freer” are relevant, such as, in particular, 
-  iÎI and jÎJ ⇒ xi NF yj (that is, yj Pi xi or yj Rj xi), 
or the “uniformly no freer” relation : 
-  xI UNF yJ Û
d
 either yJ NLF xI or yj Pi xi for all iÎI and jÎJ. 
All implications between the various concepts of “no freer” are straightforward. 
 
These concepts provide the “minimal comparisons” of freedom-ordered allocations. 
 
5.4 Minimal comparisons with several least free individuals. 
 
Definition: minimal comparisons. 
Consider now allocations x={xi} for a given population, and two freedom-ordered allocations 
x,x' ÎFO. Denote as M and  M ' the sets of least free individuals for the allocations x and  x' , 
and as xM and  xM
'
'  the corresponding suballocations of x and  x' , respectively. Then, the 
binary relations “minimally no less free, and weakly, strongly, intermediately TR or Tu less 






where F can stand for NLF, WLF, SLF, TR LF, Tu LF, WF, SF, TR F, Tu F, and the various 
“no freer” concepts. The relations between these binary minimal relations directly result from 
the relations between the binary relations represented by these various values of F. The 
relations with “freer” are antisymmetrical. Moreover, the following properties will be shown 
(among others of the same type): 
 
Proposition 13  
1)  If S stands for S or for TR , 
x MSFx'  and  iÎ M '⇒ xiPixi
' , 
that is, the least free individuals with x' are freer with and prefer x. 
2)  If S stands for W or for Tu ,  
x MSFx'  ⇒ $ iÎ M ': xiPixi
' , 
that is, at least one least free individual with x' is freer with and prefers x. 
 
 Uniform comparisons of equal-freedom groups will denote the comparisons where all the 
individuals of each group are treated alike, that is, AF, NLF, SLF, SF, and UNF. Uniform 
minimal comparisons of freedom-ordered allocations will denote the minimal comparisons 
with uniform comparisons of the groups of least free individuals in each allocation, that is, 
MNLF, MSLF, MSF, and MUNF. 
 
5.5 Uniform efficient freedom maximins 
 
The  various  minimal  comparisons  give  rise  to  general  concepts  of  efficient  freedom 
maximins. For a given population, we consider efficient allocations in the case where they 
are freedom-ordered, x={xi}ÎE. A given relation F can provide two concepts which are xÎE   29 
and, for each  x' Î E \{x}, either xFx'  or no  x' Fx. For brevity, we will solely consider 
uniform comparisons here. The concepts will then be analogous to those with single least free 
individuals. This leads to four concepts derived from the relations NLF, SLF, SF, and UNF 
between efficient allocations, applied to the least free groups. 
 
These efficient freedom maximin are xÎE such that for all x' Î E \{x}, 
1) For a No less free efficient freedom maximin (NLFEFM): 
x MNLFx' Û xM NLFxM
'
' Û (iÎM, jÎ M '⇒ xi NLFx j
' Û xiRi x j
' ), 
2) For a Less free efficient freedom maximin (LFEFM): 
x' MSLF x Û xM
'
' SLF xM Û (iÎM, jÎ M '⇒x j
' LF xi Û xiPj x j
' ), 
3) For a Freer efficient freedom maximin (FEFM): 
both x MNLFx' and x' MSLF x, 
4) For a No freer efficient freedom maximin (NFEFM): 
either x MNLFx'  or x' MSLF x. 
 
That is, no least free individual in a NLFEFM  prefers the individual allocation of a least free 
individual in any efficient allocation. The individual allocation of any least free individual of 
a LFEFM is preferred to their individual allocations by all least free individuals in other 
efficient allocations. Both relations hold for a FEFM. And either relation holds for each other 
allocation x'  for a NFEFM. 
 
The following properties result from the definition or will be shown: 
 
Proposition 14 
1) A FEFM is unique. 
2) There cannot be both a NLFEFM and a LFEFM distinct. 
3) The sets of FEFM and of NFEFM are respectively the intersectioin and the union 




FEFM    NFEFM. 
    LFEFM 
4)  All  least  free  individuals  of  all  NLFEFM  are  equally  free.  All  NLFEFM  are 
minimally as free as one another. 
5) Given a LFEFM, all least free individuals in other efficient allocations are freer 
with and prefer this LFEFM. 
6) In particular, all least free individuals in efficient allocations which are not a 
FEFM are freer with and prefer the FEFM if there exists one. 
7)  In  any  efficient  allocation  which  is  not  a  NLFEFM,  at  least  one  least  free 
individual is freer with and prefers another efficient allocation. 
 
For the reasons stated in the single-least-free case, the maximin choice should be the FEFM 
if there is one. Otherwise, it should be another of the considered maximins if it exists, with 
the  NLFEFM  and  the  LFEFM  having  a  property of uniformity in the defining relations. 
Moreover, in each class of maximins where there are several allocations, the second step of a 
concept of leximin consists of favoring the allocation(s) with the lowest number of least free 
individuals.   30 
 
5.6 Freedom leximins. 
  
If, for freedom-ordered efficient allocations, the comparison of least free individuals does not 
suffice to designate a maximin solution, one can then use the layer structure of freedom-
ordered allocations described in section 3.3, and compare the second least free individuals, 
possibly among a set of already selected allocations, and so on. One can also begin with 
minimally  least  free,  then  extend  consideration  to  least  free  with  a  smaller  number  of 
individuals who are freer than them, and so on. 
 
6. DIFFERENT INDIVIDUAL POSSIBILITIES 
 
6.1 Concepts and definitions 
 
A given individual may not be able to have a number of individual allocations. This depends 
on the nature of the considered allocations. One of the most important examples occurs when 
an  allocation  includes  a  job  or  an  occupation,  possibly  along  with  a  wage  for  it,  which 
requires particular capacities that not all the considered individuals have. Relatedly, different 
individuals  may  be  able  to  obtain  incomes  with  the  same  labor  in  duration,  intensity, 
formation work, etc., which differ because they have different given capacities, and therefore 
their corresponding domains of possible consumption goods and labor or leisure are different. 
Moreover, individuals have more or less different needs for consumption which permit their 
survival. Individuals may also not be able to consume certain consumption goods (such as 
dresses of inappropriate size, items one cannot use, etc.), though in this case the inadequacy 
can be expresses as a low ranking in the individual’s preferences. In addition, very stringent 
social or psychological reasons which require certain consumption or forbid  others can also 
be treated in this manner (law, norms imposed by social pressure or by the individual’s own 
decision, etc.). Let us also note that leisure, for instance measured in duration, may have to be 
considered as individual-specific, that is, each individual can benefit solely from his own and 
not  from  other’s  27.  Hence,  generally,  for  each  individual  i  there  is  a  domain  DiÍ  A  of 
possible allocations for her. If individual i chooses her allocation xi, this can solely be a 
xiÎDi. Hence, for describing individual i’s choices, her preferences preordering Ri need be 
defined on the domain Di only (preferences about allocations that one cannot have are not 
always well defined). 
 
From the point of view of distributive justice, this situation can give rise to two alternative 
ethical treatments, according as this limitation of the possible xi to Di is assigned to the 
individuals’ accountability or is not, that is, as whether each individual is a priori entitled to 
the  possibilities  permitted  by  her  Di  or  is  not.  In  the  former  case,  the  Di  are  treated  as 
individuals’  preferences  Ri  have  been.  They  have  no  direct  relevance  for  the  considered 
conception  of  public  justice.  They  solely  intervene  when  the  criterion  of  equal  notional 
freedom is expressed in the field of allocations because they determine the chosen xi, as the Ri 
do.  And,  indeed,  the  domains  Di  can  be  expressed  as  and  reduced  to  a  structure  of  the 
preferences  Ri,  in  considering  that  individual  i  always  prefers  an  alternative  in  Di  to  an 
alternative not in Di (the “sour grapes” device). In the other case, the direct evaluation of 
justice  seeks  equality  in  abiding  by  the  constraints,  and  hence  aims  at  correcting  their 
inequality. Then, the Di are constraints on the notional freedoms that are used to define 
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equally free, no less free, and freer. These positions lead to two new definitions of the sets 
Fi(xi). Given these definitions, in each case the derived definitions and a number of properties 
are exactly as those presented above. However, a crucial difference will be met with the basic 
theorem deriving the freedom-order property from the absence of improving permutations, 
and hence its existence in efficient and core allocations: the properties hold in the case of 
individual accountability/entitlement for the Di, as shown in section 3.5, but not in the other 
case. 
 
If the considered conception of justice sees the fact that the possible domains Di differ as 
relevant for direct justice, and hence as something which is unjust and should be corrected, Fi 
is to be replaced by Fi




XÍDi and xi Îci(X), 
or Fi
-(xi) = Fi(xi) 1  (Di) where  (Di) denotes the sets of parts of Di. 
 
If, on the contrary, the individuals are accountable for the limitations Di of their possibilities, 
Fi is to be replaced by Fi
+ defined as: 
XÎF x i i
+( ) Û
d
X1Di ÎFi(xi) Û xi Îci(X1Di). 
 
The concepts, relations and sets, EF, AF, NLF, and, from them, LF, NAF, F, NF, FO, least 
free, and freest, are defined from  Fi
- and  Fi
+ as they have been from Fi (expressions (1) to 
(8)). They will be distinguished with the superscripts - and + , respectively. The following 
relations hold: 
- EF Í  + EF , 
- AF ⇒  + AF , 
- NLF  ⇒  + NLF , 
+ LF ⇒  - LF . 
  It will also be shown that:  
 
Proposition 15 
Proposition 1 holds for each of the two new definitions of equal freedom EF + and EF -. 
 
  The same holds for proposition 2 that is,  
 
Proposition 16 
  xi  - AF xj Û xi  - NLF xj  and  xj  - NLF xi, 
  xi  + AF xj Û xi  + NLF xj  and  xj  + NLF xi . 
 
6.2 Characterizations from preferences and possibilities 
 
All these relations can be characterized from individuals’ preferences and possibilities. A 
relation xjÎDi means that individual i can have individual j’s allocation or can take individual  
j’s place. The following properties will be shown: 
 
Proposition 17 
17-1:  xIÎ  - EF Û (iÎI ⇒xi Î1jÎI Dj) and (i,jÎI ⇒xi Ri xj),  
each individual can have each other’s allocation but does not prefer it to her own.   32 
17-2:  xIÎ  + EF Û (i,jÎI ⇒xi Ri xj or xj¹Di), 
each individual does not prefer each other’s allocation to her own or cannot have it, that is, 
each individual does not prefer each other’s allocation that she can have, or cannot have 
each other’s allocation that she prefers. 
17-3:  xi  - NLF xjÛ xi Ri xj and xjÎDi , 
individual i can have but does not prefer individual j’s allocation. 
17-4:  xi  + NLF xjÛ xi Ri xj or xjÏDi , 
individual i does not prefer or cannot have individual j’s allocation, or she does not prefer it 
if she can have it, or she cannot have it if she prefers it. 
 
Corollaries 
xi  + NLF xj Û xi  - NLF xj or xjÏDi . 
This confirms  - NLF ⇒  + NLF . 
xi  - LF xj Û xj Pi xi or xjÏDi , 
individual i prefers or cannot have individual j’s allocation, or she prefers it if she can have it, 
or she cannot have it if she does not prefer it. 
xi  + LF xj Û xj Pi xi and xjÎDi , 
individual i prefers and can have individual  j’s allocation. 
xi  - LF xj Û xi  + LF xj or xjÏDi . 
This confirms  + LF ⇒  - LF . 
xi F -xj Û xi Ri xj, xjÎDi, and (xi Pj xj or xiÏDj) . 
xi F +xj Û xi Pj xj, xiÎDj, and (xi Ri xj or xjÏDi) . 
 
6.3 Possibilities with various accountabilities 
 
More generally, the various possibilities and impossibilities or constraints can have different 
statuses of accountability. Then, the allocation of an individual i is restricted by two domains 
of  possibilities,  Di
+   for  which  she  is  accountable,  and  Di
-   for  which  public  justice  is 
accountable, with  Di
+ ,Di
- Í A, and the overall constraint xiÎDi
+ 1Di
- . Then, the relevant set 
of possible potential freedoms becomes  Fi
m, which replaces Fi (the superscript m stands for 





-  and xiÎci(X1Di
+ ) . 
 
All the concepts of the theory can then be derived from this expression, with their relations 
and their characterizations in terms of preferences and domains of possibilities. 
 
6.4 Comparison of an individual’s freedoms, efficiency, and its realistic structure. 
 
Many properties presented without specifications of the Di extend rather straightforwardly to 
the cases where such constraints are present and differ across individuals, with the various 
moral  treatments  of  these  constraints  and  possibilities.  In  addition  to  equal  freedom  just 
noted, this is the case for freedom-ordered allocations and all their structural properties. 
 
Moreover,  the  comparisons  of  the  (potential)  freedoms  offered  to  one  individual  by  two 
allocations, say xi and  xi
'  for individual i, are derived from the general freedom comparisons 
of  xi and xj in considering that individual j is individual i and in writing xj = xi
' . We then have   33 
Rj = Ri and Dj = Di. Proceeding to these substitutions in proposition 17 and its corollaries 
provides the expressions of the freedom comparisons for the same individual in terms of her 
preferences and individual possibilities. If we restrict consideration to possible allocations in 
assuming a priori xi and  xi
' ÎDi, the result turns out to be that the freedom comparisons for 
one individual coincide with her preference comparisons: AF is Ii, NLF is Ri, F is Pi, and LF 
is Pi in reverse. This can be summarized as: 
 
Proposition 18 
For an individual and her allocations permitted by her own personal possibilities, whatever 
the entitlement/accountability status of these possibilities, the (potential) freedom and the 
preference comparisons coincide. 
 
One  consequence  is  that  (Pareto-)efficiency  can  be  expressed  with  these  freedom 
comparisons as with preferences as it classically is. 
 
However, there is a crucial difference between the various ethical treatments of the Di for one 
crucial property, the possibility of actual improving permutations and hence the freedom-
order structure of efficient and core allocations. 
 
Indeed, the individual possibilities Di are among the constraints which define efficiency and 
limit  or  permit  individual  or  collective  actions  that  define  the  core.  Hence,  the  relevant 
improving permutations are such that involved individuals receive individual allocations that 
they  both  prefer  and  can  have:  individual  i  receives  xj  such  that  xjPixi  and  xjÎDi.  The 
corollaries of proposition 17 show that this is xi LF +xj. Hence, the relevant cycles of relations 
“least free” are with  LF +, and therefore the ethical treatment of the Di which leads to the 
freedom-order property of efficient (and core) allocations is individual self accountability and 
entitlement (see section 3.5). 
 
In  the  other  case,  by  contrast,  least  free  is  - LF ,  which  is  xi
- LF xj  Û  xjPixi  or  xjÏDi 
(corollary of proposition 17). Hence this relation can be satisfied  by xjÏDi, that is, individual 
i cannot have allocation xj, and in this case the corresponding permutation is not actually 
possible. 
 
Hence,  the  freedom-order  property  of  efficient  (and  core)  allocations  when  individual 
possibilities  differ  requires  the  former  case,  that  of  self  entitlement/accountability  of 
individual possibilities and limits (in addition to the other assumptions – see proposition 6). 
The  corresponding  equal-freedom  is  the  classical  “realistic  equity”  (no  one  prefers  any 
other’s  allocation  that  she  can  have)28.  “Realistic”  refers  to  the  taking  of  individual’s 
possibilities and limits into account, and this qualificative will be kept for this case. From 
proposition 6 and the properties of the freedom-order structure, which are valid for this case, 
all the analysis of the maximin concepts, with their definitions, relations, and properties, 
remain valid for this “realistic” case. Most definitions and properties in fact solely use the 
freedom  comparisons.  When  preferences  are  written,  then  xiRixj  is  to  be  replaced  by 
xi j x NLF + Û xiRixj or xjÏDi, and xjPixi is to be replaced by xi j x LF + Û xjPixi and xjÎDi. 
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For  all  these  properties,  in  fact,  the  realistic  case  is  the  general  case  since  the  other 
corresponds to the particular case where domains Di are identical or absent. Conversely, 
though, the realistic case can formally be reduced to the case with no Di in using the “sour 
grapes” preferences  Ri
' derived from Ri in assuming that the individual never prefers an 
allocation she cannot have (see section 1.3). 
 
6.5 Realizations and the structure of possibilities 
 
Assume the individual possibilities Di are the only constraints on the allocation. If the Di are 
identical,  efficient  equal-freedom  allocations  can  be  achieved  by  simply  letting  the 
individuals freely choose their own allocation. The entitlement/accountability status of the Di 
makes no difference. In all cases, a domain identical to these Di can be the equal-freedom 
domain X. 
 
If the Di differ across individuals, letting the individuals freely choose their allocation in their 
own Di  provides an allocation which is efficient and realistically equal-freedom. In this 
choice, indeed, each individual either cannot have or does not prefer any alternative other 
than her choice, and this can apply to any other individual’s allocation. For instance, process-
liberalism is often described as free action or free exchange but, as regards distribution, it 
means entitlement to the full outcome of one’s such action, and, in fact, to the domain of 
choice defined by one’s own capacities and initial endowments. Then, in the conditions in 
which  process-freedom  is  efficient,  such  as  perfect  competition  in  which  individuals’ 
domains of choice are de facto independent (parametric prices), it is efficient and realistically 
equal-freedom. The same holds for equal labor income equalization if the entitlements to 
rents in others’ capacities during the equalization labor are considered legitimate29. 
 
With  this  self  entitlement/accountability  for  the  individual  domains  of  possibilities  Di,  a 
notional domain of choice can be any X including all Di , XÊÈDi . It always exists. It can for 
instance  be  the  union  of  these  domains,  X=ÈDi  .  By  contrast,  with  the  opposite  moral 
assumption,  the  common  notional  domain  of  choice  should  satisfy  XÍÇDi  ;  it  can  for 
instance be the intersection of these domains X = Ç Di . It does not always exist. And when it 
exists, individuals’ free choices in X do not generally provide an efficient allocation (they can 
provide an efficient allocation if and only if ci(Di)Ç(ÇDi)¹Æ for all i). 
 
However, in a more general situation, what an individual can have depends on what the 
others’  have.  The  constraints  are  not  separable,  and  individuals’  freedoms  are  not 
independent, as they are with the considered Di . Or, more generally, such constraints exist in 
addition to individualizable ones of the type of the Di , as considered in section 3.5. Then, 
with individuals’ entitlement for the Di (the “realistic” case), solely these extra constraints 
need be considered for the normative consequences of the possibilities. 
 
Proposition 6, and hence the freedom-ordered structure of efficient and core allocations and 
all the theory of the corresponding maximins, hold when these extra constraints and domain 
are symmetrical in the individual allocations, that is, when they allow all permutations of the 
individual  allocations.  This  case  has  a  fairly  large  domain  of  validity.  It  means  that  the 
considered agents have in some sense the same characteristics for “occupying the world”, 
including for the various interrelations between them. This is in particular the general case 
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for the allocation of resources of various types. Moreover, these extra constraints can often 
be  more  or  less  controlled  by  policy  rules,  and  this  symmetry-permutability  also  has  an 
ethical dimension which may require its establishment. Indeed, it constitutes the property of 
equal (identical) freedom in the case of interferring liberties. Interferring liberties means that 
an agent’s freedom of action or choice depends on others’ action of choice (the cases where 
this does not hold are those of independent freedoms, as with the Di considered above). Then, 
the symmetry of the possibility set has been shown to be identical to the principle of equal 
liberty potential, defined as the condition: “if you did what I do, I could do what you can 
do”30. If this describes actual actions which are sequential in time, this principle is equality 
with an entitlement/accountability for the effects on oneself of the dates or order of actions – 
a  kind  of  “right  of  first  occupancy”.  Note  that  symmetry-permutability  for  independent 




Proof of proposition 8 
 
Let {xI} denote the set of the |I| nonordered and unassigned individual allocations xi for iÎI. 
 
Proof of 8-5:  xIÎEF Û (i,jÎI ⇒ xiRixj). 
xIÎEF⇒
d
$ X: XÎFi(xi) for all iÎI, and hence xiÎci(X) for all iÎI, and therefore xiRixj for all 
i,jÎI since xjÎX. 
Conversely, if xiRixj for all i,jÎI, then {xI}ÎFi(xi) for all iÎI, and hence EI(xJ)¹Æ. 
 
Proof of 8-2:  xi NLF xj Û xiRixj. 
xi NLFxj ⇒
d
$ XÎFi(xi), YÎFj(xj): XÊY. But xiÎci(X) and xjÎY and hence xjÎX. Thus xiRixj. 
Conversely,  if  xiRixj,  X={xi,xj}  and  Y={xj}  are  such    that  xiÎci(X)  and  hence  XÎFi(xi),  
YÎFj(xj), and XÊY, and hence xi NLF xj. 
 
These two results entail the other parts of proposition 8, and propositions 1 and 2. 
 
Proof of proposition 17 
 
Proof of 17-2:  xI ÎEF
+ Û (i,jÎI ⇒ xiRixj or xj ÏDi). 
xI ÎEF
+⇒ $ XÎ  ) ( i i x F +  for all iÎI, and hence xiÎci(XÇDi) for all iÎI. Thus, xj ÎXÇDj and 
xjÎX for all jÎI. Therefore, if xjÎDi, then xjÎXÇDi, and xiRixj. 
Conversely, xiRixj or xj ÏDi for all i,jÎDi implies xiRixj if xj ÎDi for all jÎI, and hence xi = 
ci({xI}ÇDi), that is {xI }ÎFi
+(xi), for each iÎI.  
 
Proof of 17-4:  xiNLF






+(xj): XÊY. This implies xi=ci(XÇDi), and xjÎYÇDj and hence 
xjÎY  and xjÎX. Thus, if xjÎDi, then xjÎXÇDi, and hence xiRixj. 
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Conversely, xjÎDi and xiRixj ⇒ xiÎci({xi,xj}ÇDi). And xjÎcj({xj}ÇDj). Thus the sets X={xi,xj} 
and  Y={xj} satisfy  the conditions XÎFi
+(xi), YÎFj
+(xj), and XÊY, and therefore    xi NLF
+xj. 
 
The proofs of propositions 18-1 and 18-3 are analogous and left for the reader. 
 
These results entail the corollaries of proposition 18 and propositions 15 and 16. 
 
Proof of proposition 12 
 
If  xIAFyJ,  there  is  a  nonempty  domain  XÎEI(xI)ÇEJ(yJ).  Hence  for  all  iÎI,  jÎJ, 
XÎFi(xi)ÇFj(yj)  and  xiAFyj.  Conversely,  if  xiAFyj  for  all  iÎI,  jÎJ,  and  since  xI,  yJÎEF, 
X={xI}c{yJ}ÎEF, and XÎEI(xI)ÇEJ(yJ). 
 
If  xINLFyJ, $XÎEI(xI) and YÎEJ(yJ): XÊY. Hence, yjÎY and yjÎX for all jÎJ, and xiÎci(X) for 
all iÎI, and hence xiRixj for all iÎI and jÎJ. Conversely, X={xI}c{yJ} and Y={yJ} are such 
that XÊY, YÎEJ(yJ) since yJÎEF, and XÎEI(xI) since xIÎEF and if xiRiyj for all iÎI and jÎJ.  
 
Proof of proposition 3 
 
If i j⇒ ($ XiÎFi(xi), XjÎFj(xj): Xi Ê Xj), then xjÎXj, xjÎXi, and hence xiRixj. 
If i j⇒ xiRixj, then Xi=
d
{xj}j  i ÎFi(xi), with j i ⇒ xjÎXi and j i ⇒ Xj Í Xi , where j i means 
j i or j=i . 
 
Proof of proposition 4, and section 6.3 
 
The proof of proposition 4  is practically implied by its enunciation. The freedom ranking of 
an allocation implies the existence of least free and of freest individuals. Then, remove all 
individuals who are not both least free and freest, along with their individual allocations. 
Nothing remains if the initial allocation is equal-freedom,  but there remains a nonempty 
suballocation if it is not equal-freedom. This suballocation also is freedom-ordered. Its freest 
individuals  are  no  less  free  than  all  others  in  the  suballocation,  and  also  in  the  initial 
allocation since the removed individuals are least free in this initial allocation. They thus also 
are freest in the initial allocation. And they are not also least free in this initial allocation 
since, otherwise, they would have been removed. An analogous reasoning applies for the 
least free individuals and proves the theorem. 
 
The  layer  structure  of  freedom-ordered  allocations,  shown  in  section  6.3,  also  implies 
proposition 4 and provides further properties of these allocations. 
 
Proof of proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5-1 
Consider a freedom-ordered allocation with “ ” denoting the corresponding strict ordering of 
indices i,j,k,… That is, i j ⇒ xiNLxj. Hence, xiLFxj ⇒ i j. Thus, if there were a cycle i,j,k,…i 
such that xiLFxjLFxk… LFxi, one would have i j k i, and hence i i since   denotes a strict 
ordering, which is impossible for the same reason. Therefore, the freedom ranking structure 
bans less free cycles. 
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Proposition 5-2 
Assume there is no less free cycle for the allocation xI. Denote as  ) (
^
I x F  and  LF xI
^
( )  the 
sets of freest and least free individuals of population I with allocation xI . A priori, they may 




( ) , then  F xI
^
( ) ¹ Æ. If iÏF xI
^
( ) there exists jÎI such that xiLFxj. If xjÎF xI
^
( ) , then 
F xI
^
( ) ¹ Æ. If xjÏF xI
^
( ) , there exists kÎI such that xjLFxk. And so on. Either there is an end 
with a xR ÎF xI
^
( ) , or this is not the case. If the individuals are in finite number, in the latter 
case at one point an individual  who has already been considered has to be met. Then, a 
closed loop of individuals including this individual has been followed, as part (or all) of the 
whole path. Along this loop, each individual is less free than the next: they constitute a less 
free cycle. Thus, with a finite number of individuals (|I|<¥), the absence of less free cycles 
implies  F xI
^
( ) ¹ Æ. Delete now the freest individuals in considering the subset of individuals 
I '=I \ F xI
^
( ) and the corresponding suballocation  ' I x . If |I|<¥, then | I '|<¥. A least free cycle 
with  ' I x  also is one with xI, and hence the absence of less free cycle with xI implies that of 
less free cycles with xI’. Repeat, then, with  ' I x , the same reasoning as the foregoing one with 
xI . Then, there is a nonempty set of freest individuals in  ' I x , ) ( '
^
I x F ¹Æ. Delete these from 
I ', and continue similarly. Since |I|<¥, this process has an end. We thus have constructed a 






(xI”),… such that each individual of a layer is no less 
free than all the individuals of further layers and as free as those of her layer. This shows that 
xI is a freedom-ordered allocation. 
 
An analogous reasoning, but considering the least free individuals rather than the freest, ends 
up to the same conclusion. Then, if, for any iÎI, xiÏ LF xI
^
( ) , there exists a jÎI such that 
xjLFxi. If xjÏ LF xI
^
( ) , one continues. If this could go on indefinitely, |I|<¥ would imply the 
existence of a less free cycle. Hence  LF xI
^
( ) ¹ Æ. Reproduce the reasoning with the subset of 
individuals  I ' = I \ LF xI
^
( ) and so on. A freedom-ordered structure for xI thus is obtained as 




( ) .    
  QED. 
Varian’s (1976) remark that in a “fair” (equitable and efficient) allocation of bundles of 
commodities one individual “envies” no other and one individual is “envied” by no other is a 
consequence of proposition 6 since it is a consequence of the freedom order of the allocation, 
under the conditions (which were not explicit) of proposition 6: a finite number of individuals 
and unlimited permutability – or, alternatively, permutations solely limited by individuals’ 
limitations  for  which  they  are  held  accountable  and  replacement  of  “envies”  by  “either 
‘envies’ the other’s allocation or cannot have it”. Varian also suggests that this “unenvied” 
individual could be used in a maximin. 
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Proof of minimal comparisons. 
 
Propositions 10,11,13, and 14 include properties stating that if  x MLF ' x, and iÎ M ', then 
x LFx i i
' (and xiPixi
' ). Indeed, if jÎM, xiRixj from the definition of M, and xjPixi
'  from the 
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